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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has exploited the West’s, and in particular 
the United States, constant need for economic growth by expanding the market. It knew 
that using the freedoms and values of the West against it with promises of access to 
Chinese markets and cheap and abundant labor would cause the Western elite to 
unwittingly take up the cause for China against their governments. Because of this 
knowledge, China has willingly and wantonly abused human rights, shifted to a more 
totalitarian, religion-like, and fascist governance style, used its influence to interfere in 
the political systems of other countries, reneged on international agreements, created 
vassal-like states, and created a system where racism and bigotry are seen as patriotic. All 
this to remake the CCP in the Chinese dynasties of old images, the center of the world 
with the mandate of heaven.  
The CCP’s power over the West began in earnest in the late 2000s when it was 
decided that international influence campaigns would be used outside of China. These 
efforts were primarily led by economic interests to which the West quickly succumbed. 
The stronger the economic ties between a country and China, the more aggressive 
China’s influence operations became. China now employs a whole of government 
approach to change norms and influence global policies - media, academia, pop culture, 
business, as well as the more traditional diplomatic efforts of political and economic 
relations. The CCP has spread the message to the Chinese diaspora that no matter where 
in the world they may be, they belong to China. Chinese leaders continually use images 
of war and conquest against the West in their public speeches. Still, the West sits idly by, 
cowed mainly by economic considerations while the CCP actively encourages the theft of 
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intellectual property and market share and is well on its way to winning the global norms 
war. 
Advisors/Panelists: Dorothea Israel Wolfson, Ph.D., and Kathy Wagner Hill, Ph.D. 
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Introduction: “The supreme Art of War is to subdue the enemy without fighting”1 
The Questions 
China’s current trajectory is a threat to world order as defined since World War II 
as American-lead, Western values such as freedom of speech, human rights, and anti-
authoritarianism. This paper will answer the following questions:  
Is modern China a socialist, communist, or another type of authoritarian 
government and why does it matter?  
 What type of behaviors does China exhibit that makes it such a threat to Western 
values and why does it matter? 
 Why would China exhibit these behaviors and not be satisfied with ruling its 
territory and why does it matter? 
The Answers  
It is common sense to call China communist, after all, “communist” is in the name 
of the only political party in China. And yet, in the first chapter of this study, it will be 
revealed that the CCP’s increasingly jingoistic speech, ideology, and domestic and 
foreign actions are much closer to that of fascism than communism. In the first chapter, 
modern CCP thoughts and actions are compared to World War II Italian Fascism and the 
differences are difficult to discern. Understanding the CCP’s fascist leanings will help 
academics and policy makers better forecast China’s behavior. For example, if the West 
had been understanding China’s fascist intentions the early takeover of Hong Kong and 
the abrogation of the China-British treaty would have been foreseen. Similarly, China’s 
 





invasion of the South China Sea in breach of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) could have 
been anticipated. A broad acceptance of China as a fascist country would have 
ramifications in all social science spheres and would ripple through almost every aspect 
of modern society. It would destroy the CCP’s public image both at home and abroad.  
China is essential in today’s world. The country supplies companies around the 
world with raw materials of all kinds and consumers of every mass-market product. The 
CCP has brought tens of millions of their people out of poverty. And yet, it seems not 
enough to be on the cusp of having the world’s largest economy. When your foundation 
is revolution, you must be continually fighting or else you will fail. Such is the quandary 
of the modern CCP. The internal battles are nearly finished and they must find the next 
fight. But China will not enter the next fight blindly as they have already laid the 
groundwork for it. China has spent hundreds of millions of dollars in an attempt to 
control foreign media and the message those outlets spread, and it is not just going after 
national-level organizations. In Chapter 2, several of China’s foreign influence 
campaigns in the United States are reviewed. In particular, China’s work in a relatively 
small regional newspaper in Iowa is studied to reveal that China may have been 
manipulating Iowans in an attempt to both punish President Trump and sway U.S. federal 
trade policy.  
In the third and final chapter, the study turns to Chinese actions that invoke the 
shadow of imperialism. From economic debt-trap diplomacy to pandemic politics, the 
CCP has shown that its revolution has not ended and constant struggle and fighting with 
neighbors and the rest of the world is inevitable. Furthermore, China will continue to 
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push its figurative and literal boundaries as it attempts to keep the flames of revolution 
alive. China does not want to be one among many hegemons or in a position of sharing 
power. Sharing means that you are not in control. The CCP’s end goal is to revive the 
glory of the past as the center of the world, the Middle Kingdom, where all pay homage 
and tribute. In this world, Western values either cease to exist, or they are only applied 
when the CCP does not factor into the equation. 
It may be too late and the challenge for the West to overcome what China has 
become but it is not too late to stop China from ultimately setting global norms. 
Decupling does not seem realistic, given the interconnectedness of the global economy. 
However, countries that espouse human rights and rule of law values may consider 
economic and political censuring of human rights abusers. Countries or economic blocs 
should counter Chinese economic proposals with their own. Individual countries should 
offer incentives to businesses to either move out of China or protect them against CCP 
influence when they do operate in China and shield them from censorship. If 
governments have firm reasons why Chinese businesses should not be allowed to 
compete in their respective countries, this information should be given to the court of 
public opinion. This latter recommendation is probably the easiest and best route. The 
CCP is extremely sensitive to public opinion, one of the reasons it demands censorship in 
social media platforms, by calling out and labeling Chinese actions for what they are 
(fascist, neo-imperialist, meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries, etc.) the 
CCP would be forced to regulate those actions. 
The Dream, The Mandate 
4 
 
“China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is pursuing a strategy to make the country’s economy 
more self-sufficient while making other places more dependent on it than ever.”2  
In Chinese history, the Mandate of Heaven is the divine right to rule everything 
that the emperor could see. The Zhou Dynasty in the early 1000s B.C. claimed it and it 
has subsequently been claimed by every ruling government in China. However, it was not 
absolute, when conditions for the people turned bad, whether natural or man-made 
reasons, it was said that the governors had lost the mandate and thus were ripe to be 
overthrown. The CCP, in its current quasi-religious leanings such as labeling historic 
CCP locations as “holy sites,” has claimed the Mandate of Heaven to rule over all it 
sees.3 
Following President Nixon’s visit to China in the 1970s the West, and in 
particular the United States, expected China to follow Western-created norms of 
international relations and economics. The hope was that China would acknowledge the 
superiority of liberal democracy as the benefits of trade and accompanying prosperity 
rolled in giving the average Chinese person a taste of the West. Indeed, that a more 
prosperous Chinese people would demand democracy and Western values. Fifty years 
since those expectations are still only expectations. 
 
2 Steven Lee Myers and Keith Bradsher, “China Says It Remains Open to the 
World, but Wants to Dictate Terms,” The New York Times, November 23, 2020, accessed 
June 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-
globalization.html. 
3Javier C. Hernández, “‘Follow the Party Forever’: China Plans a Communist 





Instead of joining the current international order of democratic nations at the top 
of the global power lists, China’s authoritarian model in economics is pushing out the old 
guard and usurping what analysts thought was common sense and the right way to do go 
about being a global power. The CCP is not only sharing its economic model throughout 
the world but also its ideology of a new set of international norms. China buys allies with 
cheap loans while simultaneously stealing territory, intellectual property (IP), and values 
from them.45 It says that it wants peace and prosperity for all but militarizes and closes air 
and sea spaces at a rate the rest of the world struggles to keep up.  
Current Chinese leaders are constantly using words and phrases like “national 
rejuvenation,” “China Dream,” and “return to the center of the world.”6 A return to the 
Ming Dynasty’s greatness and heights. From the 1300s through the 1600s the Ming 
Dynasty, though vastly different geographically than today’s China, ruled through 
cultural and economic accomplishments. Countries as far as Africa paid tribute to China 
and it had an unrivaled navy and navigational understandings that European counterparts 
could not comprehend. The navy had seen so much of the world that the Ming Emperors 
believed that nothing else could match it and decided that the outside world was not 
 
4 Al Jazeera. “Southeast Asia Wary on China, Belt and Road Initiative: Survey.” 




5 Shiro Armstrong, “Assessing the Scale and Potential of Chinese Investment 
Overseas: An Econometric Approach,” China & World Economy 19, no. 4 (August 2, 
2011), accessed February 26, 2021, doi:10.1111/j.1749-124x.2011.01248.x, p.22-37. 
 
6 Liu Hong and Ying Chen, XI JINPING ERA: His Comprehensive Strategy 





worth engaging it was so beneath the Chinese people. Following this time of greatness, 
the West forced Chinese engagement and humiliated them in doing so. The CCP, and 
current Chinese President Xi Jinping in particular, felt this abdication by the Ming 
Dynasty had cost future generations their birthright as the culture, political, military, and 
economic leaders of the world.7 Even worse than denying them their right, this abdication 
has caused generations of Chinese to lose face with the rest of the world. But now, China 
is in a place to right the wrongs of the past and to take back what was stolen from it and 
repay past humiliations. To return the dream, ignite the rejuvenation, and return to its 
rightful place as the center of the world. 
Despite the West’s and the United States' best efforts engagement has not worked 
in the way intended. The CCP continues to become more hostile externally and more 
totalitarian internally. Time and economic improvements have not caused a freedom 
movement in China; rather, they have allowed the CCP to entrench itself in almost every 
aspect of daily life in China and more and more into the daily lives of non-Chinese. The 
American policy to change China that was first introduced by President Nixon has failed 
and the longer the U.S. takes to understand this already decided fact, the more damage is 
done. As former CCP instructor Cai Xia bluntly states:  
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party not only used the engagement policy 
to create favorable conditions for achieving their goals, but they also never 
flinched on the sensitive and complex issues concerning CCP rule. For their part, 
American leaders, out of goodwill and wishful thinking, intentionally or 
unintentionally, covered up or ignored some sensitive and complex issues (mainly 
concerning civil and political rights and Taiwan), and at times even used 
ambiguous wording to make de facto concessions.8 
 
7 Ibid. 3. 
 
8 Cia Xia, “China-US Relations In The Eyes Of The Chinese Communist Party: 




During the West’s period of engagement, the CCP used the time to entrench itself 
in supply lines throughout the world and create new norms of how things were 
manufactured and what it meant to do business in China. Instead of confronting these 
changes, Western leaders used vague and vacillating policies which were accommodating 
China’s new rules. 
At Johns Hopkins University, then-President Clinton noted in a speech, “By 
joining the WTO, China ... is agreeing to import... economic freedom.”9 However, China 
never feared the West’s talk of change as they knew that capitalist impulses would drive 
Western customers to them. Indeed, China knew and planned on capitalism turning on its 
institutions - making Western companies and the elite willingly attack the very norms 
that created their wealth and their positions of power on behalf of, even if unknowingly, 
the CCP. 
Much like the West-Soviet struggle was as much geopolitical-realism as it was 
ideological, so is the West-Sino battle, with each attempting to win hearts and minds. 
Certainly, both are necessary to understand China’s rise and ambitions. John 
Mearsheimer observed that China is doing what rational states do - pursue power to 
protect itself in a zero-sum anarchic system.10 However, the CCP’s ideology feeds into 











writing, Xi Jinping Thought is the mandated curriculum throughout Chinese society 
which promotes faithfulness to the Party over everything else. Surely this is a combining 
of ideology and realism to face the current and future difficulties that China will have in 
an anarchic system. 
China is nearing a point where it does not need the West or the United States 
beyond that of a customer. It has developed its domestic economy and brought it from a 
developing country and cheap labor source to a technological leader in many areas. The 
current era of Chinese leadership saw its opening and took it after decades of waiting 
patiently. 
Engagement, Appeasement, Abdication, Redemption? 
The West has fueled China’s rise. Decades of believing that Western values had 
prevailed also lent to a lack of concern about what China was doing behind the scenes. 
Indeed, the West is guilty of what the Ming Dynasty did, abandoning part of the world 
because of its hubris that nothing could challenge it. While the West was preoccupied 
with other things, the CCP increased China’s geographical borders and influence. 
However, since the Tiananmen Square incident on 5 June 1989, the CCP ideology 
changed from socialism and communism to something different. The CCP is haunted by 
the failures of the past and it drives them with a fever-like determination to control 
everything that might cause them to lose control, thus falling like the Ming Dynasty fell 
and repeating history. 
In this small timeframe for China to exert its control, the CCP must usurp the old-
world order and replace it with its own. Time is against the CCP, they must 
overwhelming proof that their system is superior while its economy is strong, before their 
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population ages, and before other countries understand that China is playing a zero-sum 
game - if China wins, everyone else loses. To hurry things along as quickly as possible, 
China will lie, cheat, and steal, or any other means to the end. The CCP is using 
subterfuge to belie its motives and conceal its desires via a whole-of-government 
approach, including public and private society, that is unparalleled in world history to 
achieve the China Dream. The China Dream and the CCP’s goals run counter to Western 
ideals and values. 
Why does the CCP have a zero-sum outlook? Because its power is derived from 
domestic stability. Increases in international recognition and perceived global strength 
lend credence to its domestic strength. Instability domestically and internationally causes 
chaos and chaos would be the end of the CCP. It is not like a party in a democracy that 
may lose an election cycle but regain power the next, it is all or nothing. If the CCP loses 
power for a season, it is all over. 
What are some of the norms the CCP wishes to change? According to the PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The rights to subsistence and development are superior to 
human rights. This is the viewpoint of human rights with Chinese characteristics - 
sovereign rights are superior to human rights.”11 If China, as a world power, has its own 
set of norms, how is the rest of the world supposed to compete? It cannot and this is the 
crux of China’s zero-sum game philosophy. In this regard, China will continue to change 
 
11 Cia Xia, “China-US Relations In The Eyes Of The Chinese Communist Party: 





international norms and conventions to suit its objectives which include the censoring of 
Western values and freedoms.  
One of China’s main methods of attack is to accuse other countries of exactly 
what it is doing. Specifically, using Western laws and values against the West, constantly 
openly reminding the West of past sins, for example, slavery and racism, while the CCP 
uses Uyghur slave labor inside of China and repressing other ethnic and religious 
minorities to the point of being labeled genocide and local officials have been instructed 
by the highest levels of CCP leadership to show “no mercy” to non-Han minorities.12 The 
most homegrown internal descent inside of China is often labeled as foreign interference 
while Chinese Government-backed Confucius Institutes and Unified Front offices sow 
discord in foreign lands using the media and press of the host country. 
According to Cai, the CCP has mastered the art of playing the victim. According 
to her, someone that taught the technique to the regime’s leaders, if China accuses one 
country of doing something deceptive, that means that that is what China is doing.13  Cai 
continues that these contradictory actions are needed because the “Party’s ideology is 
contradictory, inconsistent, and inferior” that changes whenever the Party needs it to.14 
She concluded that the West needs to judge China by its actions, not its flowery and 
 
12 Phoebe Sedgman and Jing Li, “China Eyes Rare Earth Export Curbs for U.S. 




13 Cia Xia, “China-US Relations In The Eyes Of The Chinese Communist Party: 







fawning words, as the CCP has a different definition of morality that only involves doing 
what is best for the Party.15 If one is sure and confident in oneself, you do not need to 
play deceptive shell games. 
The CCP has created a surveillance state that is unrivaled in the modern world 
and harkens back to the fascist states of World War II and has begun exporting the 
technology to willing client states around the world. Government propaganda is a part of 
daily life for the Chinese people and it is quickly becoming the norm for other countries 
to censor their people on behalf of the Chinese regime. China’s controlling actions inside 
China are better understood than those outside of China, though they follow the same 
pattern. Just like domestic China has a social credit score and system, so do foreign 
countries. If a country or company wants to have relations with China, they must 
subjugate themselves to China’s rules. This is a return to the ancient Chinese tradition of 
tributes and is the core of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 
2025. 
Made in China 2025 is intended to make China technologically independent by 
2025. To do so, China has forced Western companies operating in China to cede IP to the 
government. In tum, China uses the IP to create a domestic version of the product. Thus, 









The BRI, ostensibly billed as economic and infrastructure aid, puts Chinese-
owned or operated ports in geopolitical strategic locations. It also saddles the receiving 
country with billions of dollars in debt with conditions so stringent that the country often 
defaults before the project is even complete and allowing China to take control of the 
project and territory. This form of debt-trap diplomacy is also a form of neo-imperialism 
as it is mostly aimed at poor, developing countries. Although the BRI is described as a 
win for everyone, really it is a zero-sum game with China forcing smaller countries into 
aligning with China’s interests in a new version of feudalism. Again, Cai advises that 
during her time of instructing CCP leaders, it was taught that the BRI was primarily a 
military project.17  
A good example of this BRI debt trap is Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, in the late 2000s, 
badly needed an economic stimulus. China provided a loan for the construction of a 
major port facility that was not needed but the economic inflow would be a boon for the 
country. The contract was signed and included a clause that the port would not be used 
for any military activities. Shortly after the contract was signed, Sri Lanka defaulted and 
the port lapsed to Chinese control for 99 years. After completion, the Chinese Navy 
started to use it as a port-of-call.18 This calculated move by China looks incredibly like 




18 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Chinese Belt and Road Investment Isn't All Bad or 





excoriated as imperialist, racist, and unlawful. Additionally, it likes very reminiscent of 
the tributary system with client states. 
Looking at more modern methods of imperialism, the Chinese government rules 
the cyber realm. Whether it be hacking companies or insisting upon Internet censorship 
around the world, China is the world leader in creating new norms for a new frontier. 
Worldwide, companies are afraid to anger the CCP and choose to self-censor rather than 
speak freely. The Chinese government-linked a Marriott employee in America to “liking” 
a free Tibet tweet and pressured the company into firing the employee.19 But Chinese 
cyberstalking does not end at tweets and posts. Recently, Chinese influence campaigns 
have been revealed in Western countries to gain the support of academics, politicians, 
and the elite of society. 
Due to a variety of reasons, Americans, and Westerners in general, suffer from 
deep mirror-imaging biases when conducting foreign relations. This mirror imaging 
causes problems when policymakers attempt to discern how China will act. Rather than 
look at the facts, policy makers like to go with their gut and what feels right. An example 
of this is when Presidents W. Bush and Obama made lite of Russian actions, which only 
embolden Russian President Putin.20 If Western policy makers want to get China right, 
they need to consider China’s history and traditions, what it was and where it wants to 
 
19 Wayne Ma, “Marriott Employee Roy Jones Hit ‘Like.’ Then China Got Mad,” 




20 Alex Beall, “How Obama, Bush, Clinton Viewed Russia's Putin over Time,” 





return, and of course look at objective reality and facts on the ground and not just China’s 
flowery language and promises. 
Objectively speaking, the CCP will not decide to become a liberal democracy or 
even loosen its control over its people or economy. History has shown that this is true 
with totalitarian regimes. To expect China to follow international norms that were set by 
the West is highly unlikely. Just because the West follows the rules is no reason to expect 
China to follow them, especially after 100 years of the CCP challenging those rules have 
proven otherwise. The rational expectation is that China will challenge, destabilize, and 
replace Western norms and values unless the West awakens to the situation that 
















Definitions and Methodology 
The terms Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOE), and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOE), are all synonyms and should not be mistaken for either the 
Chinese people or the government of Taiwan or its people.  
The CCP in this study is a totalitarian organization, bent on a one-party rule and 
controlling everything to include foreign companies operating in China and the Chinese 
National Security Law, which supposedly covers everyone and everywhere in the 
world.21 
Confucius Institutes are partnerships between Chinese universities and 
counterparts in other countries to promote the Chinese language and culture. The funding 
for these institutes is provided by the Chinese government, which sets the rules of what 
and how the aforementioned topics are taught, or what is not taught. The Chinese 
government’s role in the curriculum has raised various concerns, especially from 
proponents of academic freedom.22 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a Chinese government worldwide 
infrastructure program started in earnest in 2013 and could be considered the main pillar 
of Chinese foreign policy so much so that it has been added to China’s constitution. 
 
21 Naomi Xu Elegant, “If You're Reading This, Beijing Says Its New Hong Kong 
Security Law Applies to You,” Fortune, October 14, 2020, accessed July 08, 2021, 
https://fortune.com/2020/07/07/hong-kong-law-scope-extraterritorial-jurisdiction/. 
22 Claude Zanardi, “China’s Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Cases 
of Confucius Institutes and Chinese Naval Diplomacy,” Journal of Political Power 9, no. 




Approximately 140 countries have signed on to the BRI in hopes of receiving financing 
and aid in building roads, railroads, ports, dams, and other infrastructure projects. 
Criticisms of the BRI usually revolve around loans with nearly impossible terms to 
impoverished nations that have no hope of paying them back and thus geographically 
strategic areas revert to Chinese control.23 
Made In China 2025, like the BRI, is a national industrial plan to develop China’s 
manufacturing from low-tech to high-tech goods and becoming the world leader in 
technology, especially in the realm of semiconductors. The plan also calls for China to 
slowly move from importing raw materials from overseas, with a goal of 70 percent of 
critical componants, like semiconductors, to be sourced domestically. Made In China 
2025 drew criticism from foreign governments due to its initial blatant advertising that by 
2025, China hoped to starve foreign competitors out of business.24 
The terms “the West” and “Western countries” are used interchangeably and are 
defined as:  
Western civilization, Western world, Western society, is the heritage of social 
norms, ethical values, traditional customs, belief systems, political systems, 
artifacts and technologies of the Western world. The term also applies beyond 
Europe to countries and cultures whose histories are strongly connected to 
Western Europe by immigration, colonization, or influence. For example, 
Western culture includes determinated countries in the Americas and Oceania.25 
 
 
23 Cia Xia, “China-US Relations In The Eyes Of The Chinese Communist Party: 
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Chapter 1: The F-Word in Political Science: Communist China’s Fascist 
Underpinnings 
“To know your Enemy, you must become your Enemy.”26 
Political scientists often describe communism and fascism as mutually exclusive 
“left” and “right” poles on the political spectrum. The extreme behavior of twentieth-
century Axis powers also gives the term “fascism” a quality that encourages its use in 
political hyperbole but discourages its consideration as an objective assessment of any 
country’s political system. However, the CCP’s nationalist ideology (including domestic 
policy), irredentist claims in the South and East China Seas, and neo-colonialism in 
Africa and South America increasingly challenge this presumed polarity. The question is: 
“What if the CCP has evolved from communism to fascism?” In this chapter, Mussolini’s 
Italy is used as a fascist archetype and evaluates Chinese ideology and behavior against 
these criteria. An understanding of the CCP as fascist helps predict future PRC foreign 
policy behavior and evolution by analyzing the context and historical markers and 
modeling those for the probability of future results. This analysis will test beliefs that 
may not be correct. China-watchers, statesmen, and political scientists see the CCP in a 
new light if China is fascist becomes the new authoritative position.  
In the case of human rights, economics, and geo-political relations semantics and 
normative behaviors matter. Extensive acceptance of the CCP as fascist would: 
• undermine PRC “soft power” worldwide and diminish the appeal of the 





• discredit China’s comprehensive campaign to demonize Japan, the U.S., 
and Western society and norms; 
• encourage PRC citizens to consider a critical reappraisal of the CCP’s 
narrative of human rights and economics, and by extension, its legitimacy; 
• encapsulate a concise explanation that clarifies PRC irredentism and its 
quest for hegemony for the casual observer; 
• advance upon existing historical models used for understanding Chinese 
thinking and predicting future Chinese behavior; 
• isolate China and stigmatize its non-normative behavior by prompting a 
stark “us and them” categorization, with the majority of the world as “us,” 
and fascist China as “them.” 
Why Define the Chinese Communist Party? 
Analysis of China stresses Chinese behavior within a limited framework and 
frequently overlooks fundamental societal and political influences causing these actions. 
For example, the CCP’s expansionist campaign in the SCS and ECS is usually 
considered, by the CCP, as an effort to defend Chinese sovereignty claims against 
supposed infringements from neighboring countries. While the descriptive analysis may 
be useful in understanding China’s view of events or portraying Chinese actions within a 
specific moment in time, this tactical analysis lacks direct links to political incentives 
underlying Chinese conduct. 
Modern political scientists have had difficulty politically re-defining the CCP 
since the Party’s post-Mao turn towards reactive nationalism. Labels range from 
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imprecise terms such as “authoritarian” to more unclear ones such as “market-Leninist.” 
However, when compared against objective criteria, the CCP’s current ideology and 
actions in ongoing maritime disputes and economic ventures look like fascism more than 
any other political ideology.  
Communism vs. Fascism 
The amount of scholarly work done on defining communism and fascism is 
extensive and cannot be ignored. There is a new definition for every scholar and such is 
the way of political science in dealing with less than quantifiable subjects. And yet, 
several researchers have tried to quantify both ideologies or to put them in terms that may 
be easier to understand than abstract ideologies. There are differences in the manner and 
mode of communism and fascism and yet perhaps the similarities overcome the 
differences and most if not all totalitarian regimes are fundamentally the same despite the 
origin point.  
Many scholars, especially in the 1970s era, expressly rejected the idea that the 
Chinese Government could be considered fascist. Elkins probably had the most 
compelling argument noting that there was an actual fascist government in China and it 
was not the Maoist revolution. Rather, he begins our analysis with reasoning by an in-
depth exploration of the Chinese “Blue Shirts Society” and rejected the idea that Maoist 
Communism could be interpreted as fascist. The Blue Shirts Society of the 1930s was a 
covert Chinese bloc of the Kuomintang (KMT) that exhibited similar characteristics to 
Italian fascists.  He explained that true fascism was a “double rejection of Marxist 
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socialism on the left and classical capitalism on the right.”27 He continued that Chinese 
fascism in the form of the Blue Shirts paled in comparison with its European cousins 
because during the Blue Shirt period the Chinese nationalistic bourgeoisie did not have 
the needed social or economic power to gain domination over the left or right.28  
Notice that the KMT was compared against Italian Fascism and not national 
socialism which are distinct ideologies and yet equating national socialism to fascism is a 
common occurrence both during the previous studies of Chinese fascism and today and 
needs to be mentioned.29 Both Sauer and Dulffer attempted to disabuse their readers of 
this fallacy while noting the historical underpinnings of communism and fascism.3031 
Sauer firmly establishes the link of national socialism with communism. According to 
Sauer, fascism may be described as the manipulation of providers while communism and 
national socialism are the manipulations of consumers.32 At first glance, this seems to be 
counterintuitive to the socialist belief of controlling the means of production but it fits the 
theory of the fascist PRC Government is more adroit at controlling state-owned 
 
27 Elkins, W. F. “Fascism in China: The Blue Shirts Society 1932-37.” Science & 
Society 33, no. 4 (1969): 426–33. www.jstor.org/stable/40401439. 
28 Ibid, 30. 
29 Chang, Maria Hsia. “Fascism and Modern China.” The China Quarterly 79 
(1979): 553–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000038315. 
30 Dulffer, Jost. “Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 11, no. 4 (1976): 109–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947601100407. 
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enterprises and “two-systems one country” than allowing the people to decide production. 
Not to be outdone, Dulffer argued that Karl Marx’s first forays into socialist thought were 
fascist ideology because it focused on controlling the industrial elite.33 One further 
similarity between the two ideologies according to Dulffer is that mass terrorism is 
needed in both to overcome the “lack of enthusiasm” of the masses.34 In any event, these 
two academics believed that although national socialism is not the same as fascism the 
line is thin between fascism and communism to the point that they might be the same and 
only our cognitive dissonance separates the “bad” fascist of World War II with the 
“good” or at least “acceptable” communists of today.  
Further highlighting differences between communism and fascism by comparing 
the daily life of the average person under fascism and communism, Corner argued that 
life under a fascist regime has relatively little impact on day-to-day issues as opposed to 
that of someone under a communist regime, and introducing the idea that fascism is more 
business-focused and top-down versus communism’s purportedly grass roots, bottom-up 
society.35 Lammers found much the same when he studied communism in the United 
Kingdom. He concluded that communism’s goal was to control the individual or bottom-
up control while fascism’s end was control of the nation or top-down control.36  
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Finally, in defense of fascism and communism being separate ideologies, much 
like Corner theorized, Furet found that fascism was capitalism taken to extremes. He 
discovered this while attempting to find a dialectical correlation between the two 
ideologies noting that they both have the same starting point of finding a “political deficit 
of modern democracy.” According to his findings, fascism is more of capitalism 
exacerbated democracies issues (which is close to the currently accepted definition) while 
socialism and communism are more original in that they were created to fill the voids of 
democracy’s shortcomings.37 In other words, communism was a cure while fascism was a 
symptom of democracy’s shortcomings.  
But are They Really Different? 
To underscore this, communism and fascism share many core beliefs and 
founding ideas. According to Tismaneanu fascism and communism are opposites on the 
political spectrums and yet they share the same cultural, social, and political ideas.38 
Specifically, even though they start at different points the result is the same: a new world 
order by destroying the old and disposing of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, Tismaneanu 
believed that both ideologies have the same fundamental logical flaws: “a lack of 
sensitivity to the psychological makeup of the mankind,” and “the needs of many for 
deep spiritual or cultural sources of meaning.”39 In other words, people have an inherent 
 
37 Furet, Francois, and Ernst Nolte. Fascism and Communism. Lincoln, Neb.: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004. 
38 Tismaneanu, Vladimir. The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some 




desire to be free and to make decisions for themselves. Therefore, according to 
Tismaneanu fascism and communism are inseparably connected.  
The two ideologies are two sides of the same “political religion” bound together 
by the “sacralization of the language and rites” of violence against regime opponents, as 
posited by Ehret.40 This takes the connection between fascism and communism a step 
further than “mere” social constructs. If to be a government means to have a monopoly 
on the use of force and violence, then a totalitarian government means to have a 
monopoly on even the hopes and dreams of people to where the individual means nothing 
compared to the survival of the regime;41 a monopolistic force deployed to maintain 
control and protect the regime throughout the world but not to protect the public. 
Finally, both fascists and communists share many of the same psychological 
tendencies. Eysenck tried to isolate and disprove a psychological relationship between 
fascism and communism. To do this, he created an axis matrix of radical-conservatism as 
the X-axis and either tough-mindedness or tender-mindedness as the Y-axis. He expected 
to find fascists high on tough-mindedness and communists high on the tender-
mindedness scales. However, he found they were about the same. These findings greatly 
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dismayed Eysenck as they disproved his theory;42 however, his findings lend credence 
that even on an emotional or psychological level, fascism and communism are closer than 
given credit for.  
A Rose by Any Other Name 
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as 
sweet.”43 This popular refrain from William Shakespeare’s play Romeo and Juliet, and 
means the significance of an object or person is the way it is or its actions and not 
because of what it is called. Perhaps it does not even matter if fascism and communism 
are the same ideology in reality or if they are completely separate. What matters more is 
actions and not words or aspiring philosophies. Now that we have looked at the 
differences and similarities between the two ideologies, it is plausible now to focus on the 
PRC Government and exactly where it is in terms of modern ideology.  
The question of the PRC Government’s flirtations with fascism was last seriously 
considered in academic circles in the 1970s, where similarities were examined with the 
sometimes-fascist Kuomintang regime.44 This comparison was natural because both 
governments were Chinese and one championed Leninist socialism, which shared some 
fascist similarities. However, Chang believed that scholar of the time did not fully 
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understand or comprehend Chinese governments; those elements of Chinese fascism, 
specifically within both the Maoist Communist and Kuomintang Governments, was not a 
pure form of fascism and therefore cannot be labeled as fascism. Through Chang’s 
comparison of Maoist China to Nazi Germany, she noted that the PRC Government was 
not fascist.45 But in this comparison, Chang herself makes a mistake of labeling Nazi 
Germany as fascist when it was a form of socialism with many similarities to fascism.46 
Essentially, Chang is guilty of the same mislabeling that she accused her contemporaries 
of doing.  
More recently, Evans-Pritchard also attempted to defend China while at the same 
backhandedly casting doubt on China’s communist credentials by labeling China’s “One 
Country, Two Systems” or “Communism with Chinese or Xi Jinping Characteristics” as 
“market Leninism.”47 Thus, inferring that China’s economic behavior is a betrayal of true 
communism. In the end, Evans-Pritchard confesses that Chinese economics cannot be 
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Going a step beyond Evans-Pritchard, Tsou and Gregor argue that the PRC’s 
fascist ways are more than just economic-based.484950 Indeed, like fascist thinkers, 
Chinese leaders from SunYat-sen to Mao Tse-tung to current PRC President Xi Jinping 
have all espoused patriotic education, rapid industrialization, information control, and 
revanchism to rejuvenate China and return the nation to its historic role as an Asian 
hegemon, not subordinate it to the stateless, class-based revolution of communism.5152 
Gregor returned in additional work to use China as an example of neofascism and the rise 
of other fascist-like modern ideologies based on his pedagogical studies.53  
As more evidence of this, even in today’s world, China rallies its people around 
jingoistic threats and half-truths. She points out that in 2013, China, to hide domestic 
issues, rallied its people to “fight a protracted war” against Japan.54 A further example of 
antisocial behavior by China was the Chinese Government urging Chinese film producers 
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to make an abundance of anti-Japanese films and TV shows.55 This is hardly the 
neighborly behavior of an ideology that believes in the unity of men and class against the 
elite.56  
As noted previously, Chang was one of the PRC’s staunchest apologists for 
reasons, as semantic as they were, that modern China was not a fascist country. However, 
later in her life she recanted those earlier arguments and pointed to the PRC actions, such 
as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre as a turning point to extreme patriotic 
nationalism as a cornerstone of its ideology and legitimacy. This change in ideology has 
caused the PRC to fundamentally change Chinese myths, history, and heritages.57  
Building on the Tiananmen Square massacre, Clowes lists extensive examples of 
modern-day colonialism (neo-colonialism) expected more of a fascist government than a 
socialist one. In particular, he noted that China has lent $126 billion to African countries 
with terms that seem very heavy-handed to the point of impossible to repay. Indeed, 
many are calling these terms what they are, economic imperialism. Some are even calling 
the terms and Chinese actions in the South China Sea racist.58 Hutt points out that 
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Chinese actions in the South China Sea are blows not only to the international order but 
to the very rule of law that governs the international space, sending a message that 
economic and military power means more than human rights and neighborly relations.59  
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Government rarely shares news about their 
obliviousness and only works with other governments as it benefits them. As Paul Miller 
argued, Xi’s “prime concern was not lives at risk, or containment of the virus, but rather 
the nation’s and his reputation, place in the global supply chain and his grip on power.”60 
By contrast, “democratic leaders are not afraid of information, and as a result, can judge 
the efficacy of their efforts, can fine-tune and adjust, and can respond to the flow of news 
in a way that optimizes lifesaving.”61 Miller and others have accurately cataloged how 
Chinese leaders lied and tried to cover up the emergence of the coronavirus in December 
and January to save face.62 
With the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue is bigger and timelier than ever. The 
Chinese Government is not answerable to its civil society and therefore cares little about 
what happens in a day-to-day setting, a fascist hallmark as previously described by 
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public pressure. As Miller stated, “Chinese policymakers never have to face the voters, 
which is why, for example, there was little lasting reform or meaningful accountability 
after a scandal in 2008 in which tens of thousands of Chinese infants fell ill and required 
hospitalization after drinking contaminated milk.”63 
Why Ideology Matters 
A China that is fascist instead of merely “authoritarian” or communist has 
significant consequences that transcend political semantics. As an antidemocratic and 
aggrieved country animated by revanchism and a zero-sum world view, China views 
itself as a humiliated victim denied national greatness by foreign hegemons. It reacts to 
economic downturns, perceived foreign threats, domestic unrest, and international law in 
ways fundamentally different from countries not animated by overriding nationalism. 
Key implications include: 
• Reliance on reactive nationalism as a pillar of legitimacy severely limits the 
Party’s “off-ramp” options in times of crisis, particularly when Beijing has 
manufactured the “lost territories” to be part of China’s inheritance as a “core 
interest.” 
• The CCP narrative of foreign imperialism as the key enabler of Chinese 
humiliation places China’s collective psychology much closer to a “war 
mentality” than other countries and requires less justification for military action 





• In China’s view, co-opting and destabilizing free markets and international 
political and economic norms are vital to the growth and reinforcement of one-
party rule, not just another way of doing business or economics with Chinese 
characteristics. 
• Strong anti-U.S. sentiment among China’s ruling class is deeply rooted in a 
nationalistic, reactive political pathology that views the great power competition 
as zero-sum and the U.S. as the greatest threat to the PRC’s economic expansion, 
military modernization, and “national rejuvenation” through the reclamation of 
so-called “historical” territories. 
• Much like Beijing’s perceived rivalry with the U.S., its deliberate cultivation of 
hatred of Japan exceeds neighborly rivalry or resentment from previous wars: it 
promotes a belief that the humiliation and destruction of Japan will redeem 
Chinese greatness and China’s greatness is directly correlated with Japan’s 
suffering. 
• Academics cite powerful nationalist sentiment as a constraint on Beijing’s ability 
to compromise. The same academics will characterize hardline stances against 
China as counterproductive because they undermine ostensible “Chinese 
moderate” voices - even as government-controlled and directed education, media, 
and entertainment develop and stoke Chinese nationalism. 
Who You Calling a Fascist? A Case Study and Comparison of Mussolini’s Italy and 
Modern China 
The initial and still current default definition of fascist ideology was created in 
Italy by Giovanni Gentile and Benito Mussolini in 1915 through 1945. Nationalism in 
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many forms, including both cultural and radical nationalism and extreme unionism, were 
behind Italian Fascism as well as historical grievances of supposed Italian territorial 
claims; which Italians of the time considered important for Italy to demonstrate its 
modern bona fides and to overcome its decline. These fascists argued that as the 
legitimate successor to the Roman Empire and its history and territories, Italy, therefore, 
had a historical right of creating an Italian Empire in the image of Rome to colonize and 
to gain control over the Mediterranean region.64 
Much like Italian nationalism, modern Chinese nationalism focuses on blaming 
others and historical events for current injustices and internal problems. In 2013, when Xi 
Jinping became the Communist Party’s General Secretary, Xi used the term “Chinese 
Dream” to define his ambitions for China. He coined “Chinese Dream” during a visit to 
China’s National Museum in 2012 to witness an exhibition called “National Revival,” 
which focused on historical grievances. “Chinese Dream” has since become the defining 
mantra of the Xi era.65 The Chinese Dream and nationalism are also intertwined in the 
Chinese media.66 In foreign affairs, the Chinese Dream and nationalism are closely 
connected to the Belt and Road Initiative. Peter Ferdinand suggests it is now becoming a 
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vision for the PRC leadership in which China will “recover its rightful place.”67 Chinese 
nationalism fights two main groups: Japan, which occupied China from 1931 to 1945, 
and separatism, such as independence movements from people in Tibet, Xinjiang 
Province, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Chinese provinces bordering Mongolia. Supposed 
advocates of self-determination and secession, such as the US and India, are also 
targeted.68 
Interestingly, Italian Fascism’s syndicalism looks much like and predated China’s 
communist syndicalism. Indeed, the CCP’s founding leader, Mao Zedong, promoted 
syndicalism years after Italy put its stamp on what was fascism. To stay true to Lenin’s 
belief that the communists needed to be seen at the forefront of politics, Mao led his 
revolution with its center taken from the proletariat. In this way, hyper-nationalism 
replaced class distinction with Mao. Italian Fascism did the same, depicted as a 
marginalized rural nation that had to “rise against the oppressing imperialist powers and 
their capitalist minions.”69 
Revolutionary nationalism is a political ideology that calls for a nation to be 
unified by a common sense of mission due to birthright, it is also known as revolutionary 
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nationalism or proletarian nationalism.70 It was first attributed to radical syndicalism 
followers in the early 20th Century, and extensively espoused by Mussolini, which he 
noted as a philosophical juxtaposition of “radical nationalism and socialist dissident.”71 
Like the beginnings of Italian revolutionary nationalism, Chinese nationalism is rooted in 
China’s deep historical legacy as the Middle Kingdom or the center of the world, wherein 
other known countries owed subservience or tribute to China. In the 19th century, this 
sense of dominance endured a sequence of devastating events, including massive-scale 
domestic uprisings, and, perhaps even more grievous, the systematic dominance of 
foreign nations due to the lack of advanced technology in China. These nations, led by 
the regional powers of the time, Britain, France, Japan, and Russia, repeatedly 
demonstrated their military supremacy culminating in the most dramatic embarrassment 
in 1900 known as the Boxer Rebellion in which eight foreign nations invaded and 
plundered China’s national capital. The desire for revenge and retribution for this 
national humiliation burns today and fired much of the Chinese Communist revolution.72 
Much like Fascist Italy, if there is one constant of the CCP’s policies it is its ever-
growing territorial changes and claims. The accepted size of China’s territory has rarely 
been confirmed by Chinese officials, probably due to the frequent and continuing 
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changes in their territorial claims. Since the official beginning of the PRC on 1 October 
1949, the PRC has made a steady stream of claims over bother international and other 
country claimed territories and seas. Indeed, every decade the number of claims grows, 
which seems strange since often the PRC claims that these new claims have been part of 
China since “time immemorial.” It would seem that territory that had been part of a 
country since time immemorial would not need to be claimed. The PRC, which claimed it 
was a different country than the previous Republic of China, claimed five new territories 
between 1949 and 1959, two between 1960 and 1969, two between 1970 and 1979, one 
between 1980 and 1989, four between 1990 and 1999, four between 2000 and 2009, and 
two between 2010 and 2019. Most of these territorial gains came through violence and 
intimidation of neighboring nations, very much a trait of Italian Fascism.73 The amount of 
territory claimed by China since 1949 has nearly doubled the size of what China was at 
the beginning of the CCP's reign. 
Italian Fascism advocated a corporatist economic structure in which employers 
and employee collectives are connected in alliances to jointly reflect the economic 
creators of the country and work together with the government to develop an economic 
policy for the nation.74 This economic structure proposed to overcome fighting between 
 
73 Fravel, M. Taylor. “Analysis | Mike Pompeo Criticized China for Not 
Respecting Its Neighbors’ Territorial Integrity. What’s the Story?” The Washington Post. 
WP Company, February 21, 2020. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/21/mike-pompeo-criticized-china-not-
respecting-its-neighbors-territorial-integrity-whats-story/.  
74 Whittam, John. Fascist Italy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. 
36 
 
classes by inter-class cooperation.75 Like  Fascist Italy, the CCP only acknowledges itself 
as the undisputed leader of the sectoral interests of the people, companies, and 
organizations that make up the industry. The state decides which organizations will be 
accepted as official and establishes with those entities a top-down relationship. The 
organizations are to implement and enforce policies on behalf of the government.76 As 
the adjudicator of authority and assigning responsibility to one single entity for a specific 
group, the state restricts the number of players it needs to discuss policies with and co-
opts organizations’ leaderships into regulating its workers.77 This system is not limited to 
economic bodies such as business and social organizations but every face of society.78 
Mussolini, as an example of Italian Fascism and other fascist leaders, rejected 
liberalism, particularly classical liberalism, and condemned it as “the debacle of 
individualism”;79 but rather than pursuing a “reactionary reconstruction” of the pre-
French Revolution world, that was considered to be corrupted, it had “a forward-looking 
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path”.80 Because of the expected opposition of Marxist Socialism to nationalism,81 
fascism was opposed to it but it was also contrasting the “reactionary conservatism” 
founded by Joseph de Maistre.82 Italian Fascism believed that the progress of Italian 
Nationalism, along with a commitment to a modern Italy, required the upholding of 
historical practices and a strong knowledge of a common and shared history among 
Italians.83  
Like Italy of the time, the CCP sought to assert its nationalist rather than 
communist legitimacy by the use of manipulated history through “aggressive and 
consensual nationalism.”84 Chinese aggressive nationalism focuses on a painful “century 
of humiliation” and seeks to provoke widespread outrage against former colonial powers, 
particularly Japan and the United States. The goal was to make the Chinese remember 
that after 1949 the CCP rescued them and led a resurgence of national identity ever since. 
China’s consensual nationalism is more diplomatic, underlining growing cultural 
relations among modern Chinese. Through this, the CCP aims to be known as a party of 
reconciliation and reunification, thus giving itself a mandate of territorial expansion.85 
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China has rewritten its history to follow both nationalisms, defying Western scholars and 
creating a national history that is more myth than fact.86 
Italian fascists were strongly unreceptive to national socialism as Italian Fascism 
did not support Nordicism87 and did not immediately support the anti-Semitism inherent 
in Nazi ideology, although some fascists supported racist views and produced some racial 
policies at the beginning of Italy’s fascist rule. Italian laws started to change drastically as 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany strengthened ties and Italy was openly antisemitic due to 
intense pressure from Nazi Germany. In addition, some linguistic and ethnic minorities in 
Italy were also persecuted while the fascists were in power.88 
While racism, like Italian racism, was not a founding concept of the CCP, 
numerous forms of racism made it into contemporary China, many of them by CCP 
officials when it suits their domestic and international political agenda to the point that it 
is supported by the state. Racism or racial discourses do not exist as an ideology for their 
own sake or by themselves but often represent relationships of power.89 Today, China's 
racial thought can manifest in different narratives addressing the political and ideological 
requirements of CCP officials, intellectual elites, and ordinary citizens. Although the 
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most recent and telling example is the redirection of the rage of the Chinese public at 
COVID-19 toward Black Africans rather than the CCP, there are many others.9091 
No Happy Endings 
The prominent role of fascist ideology in China’s strategic trajectory has ominous 
implications for U.S. relations with China. China’s territorial disputes or human rights 
abuses cannot be rationally or dispassionately discussed due to their intrinsic, almost 
metaphysical connection with Chinese articles of faith regarding the PRC’s national 
rejuvenation and “return” to imagined great power status. Furthermore, China’s sacred 
belief in its claim of “lost” territories leaves little in the way of escape routes for China’s 
leaders should a conflict erupt over disputed sovereignty. While a Chinese military defeat 
in a Taiwan, SCS, or ECS confrontation could slow China’s expansionist campaign, the 
CCP’s fascist ideology would preclude a return to the status quo. The result would 
instead be a long-term standoff between China and its adversaries and an even more 
aggrieved and nationalistic China. 
It would seem that China suppressed its revanchist tendencies during its formative 
years because the CCP lacked the means to act on them and did not want to be measured 
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by them. This runs counter to the prevailing thought that China has had a measured and 
patient approach to international relations. However, recently, China’s national power has 
grown and the world has sought ways of accommodating its rise. The CCP’s successes in 
exploiting these opportunities have stoked confidence in its revanchist model, reflected in 
a reinforced CCP narrative of “lost” territories and foreign hegemons. If Beijing once 
again perceives the costs of expansionism to outweigh the benefits, (i.e., if 
accommodation and opportunity disappear), the CCP might resume suppression of its 
irredentist actions and supporting narratives. But placating China’s current demands is 
more likely to whet China’s appetite, not sate it. 
Conclusion 
 In the 1970s many academics attempted to decern between fascism and socialism, 
with some attempting to find correlations with the Chinese Government of the time. With 
few outliers, most agreed that the two ideologies had distinctive origins but the end states 
are not dissimilar enough not to be at least discussed as the same. Furthermore, more 
current scholarly looks at China’s actions, as opposed to its words, have clearly shown a 
more fascist-like emphasis on economic control over not only its people but of its 
neighbors and other countries, as well as other disturbing fascist trends like racism and 
cultural superiority. Modern China may have started with the goal of being a worker’s 
paradise with working-class ideals but that dream has died as the PRC Government 
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makes more and more moves not to protect the people, but the Party. Indeed, Xi himself 
instructed the PRC military that their duty was to the Party and not the people.92  
 Despite the evidence of fascist China, the same scholars who identified the 
similarities between fascism and communism and China’s embrace of fascist tactics all 
fall short of labeling China as fascist. Even U.S. officials seem unwilling to make the 
connection. Hoffman, a former high-level intelligence official, described China’s initial 
reaction to the Corona Virus in terms of the Soviet Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
disaster, with accompanying fascist top-down controls.93 This could be for multiple 
reasons, mostly revolving around Chinese economic tactics in countries around the world 
and other bullying efforts of academics that one would expect to see from a fascist 
regime. Alternatively, the answer could be far simpler – that no one has connected the 
dots in a manner that would be difficult to refute, such as a case study of fascist Italy and 
modern China. In any event, it is clear that further study is needed to solidify the claim 
that China is now a fascist country in name and deed and that perhaps there is no such 
thing as a communist regime, in fact, rather communism has either not been established 
correctly or, in reality, communism is a quasi-fascist political ideologue.     
Many of these results are worrying; however, fascism is an accurate descriptor of 
China’s political conduct. The features and implications of fascism are widely 
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understood, and precise language will support precise understanding. Reluctance to 
articulate China’s aggressiveness has not moderated Chinese attitudes or behavior. On the 
contrary, rejection of a “fascist” label for China burnishes the CCP’s “anti-fascist” and 





















Chapter 2: No Place to Hide: Foreign Influence and Propaganda in the Rural 
United States 
“Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and 
confirms their projections. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, 
occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment — that which 
they cannot anticipate.”94 
 In February 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping was widely quoted as 
saying “Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda 
reports must extend their tentacles.”95 There is no shortage of information and 
explanations of official Chinese government media expansion throughout the world and 
increasingly in the United States. Indeed, the official Chinese government newspaper of 
record China Daily’s filing under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) 
reveals a yearly average of $10 million in advertising spending in U.S. newspapers since 
2011.96 It would be expected that most of this spending, and therefore the majority of the 
intended impact, is to land upon readers of America’s most prominent newspapers such 
as the New York Times and the Washington Post. To see 100 percent of the China Daily 
budget used in such media outlets would not be a surprise. And yet Chinese U.S.-targeted 
media is showing up in smaller, more locally-focused news media. Why would China 
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throw advertising money at rural towns in Iowa rather than metropolitan areas? Does 
Chinese foreign advertising in rural U.S. areas affect policy at the federal level in favor of 
China? Does the Chinese government believe it but has the strategy backfired in recent 
times? This chapter will examine China’s rural advertising in the United States to 
determine if there is a correlation between said advertising and federal policies that could 
be considered beneficial to Chinese interests. Additionally, this chapter will also 
demonstrate that China’s investment in local newspaper advertising suggests another 
example of China continuing in its neo-imperial and neo-colonial ways.  
The primary portion of this chapter will focus on China’s advertising and 
marketing campaign to disrupt communications on the Internet and social media to 
control public perception in the US.  This involves reviewing the published literature 
regarding Chinese manipulation of media worldwide, in Western countries, and finally in 
the United States. The focus will then shift to how China employs disruptive campaign 
tactics to a rural newspaper in Iowa. This study demonstrates what China is doing is 
disruptive and perilous insofar as it uses American’s democratic establishments and free 
speech to undermine the foundations of democracy. 
It is well known that every country uses some kind of foreign influence with both 
its friends and enemies. Whether that be through foreign aid or other soft-power means or 
hard-power, the goal is the same: influence a foreign country to better suit the needs and 
desires of the giving country. The only difference with China is that they play the game 
so much better than any other country. This is due to China having the resources, the lack 
of domestic accountability, and the seemingly immense hubris that allows China not to 
recognize its hypocrisy in regards to foreign interference.  
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Many researchers have studied Chinese foreign influence campaigns. Most of 
which have focused on the macro, worldwide, and national-level campaigns. Indeed, it 
was difficult to choose which of the macro-level studies to include in this study. But few 
have dug deeper into the micro-level influence campaigns, probably because of the lack 
of initial interest. There were some, and some were mentioned in passing in the larger 
studies but overall, it was difficult to find evidence of Chinese influence at the rural, 
American level and how that affects policy at the federal level. 
Influence via Foreign Direct Investments 
Shiro Armstrong writes that to understand the scope and scale of Chinese 
government propaganda efforts throughout the world and its implications, it is important 
to note that Chinese official foreign direct investments (FDI), including media 
investments, are what they sound like: “investments.” But not traditional investments in 
the foreign location, though they do that as well, rather they are expected to reap 
dividends for China even at the expense of the country nominally receiving the FDI.97 If 
China is not receiving monetary rewards for their investments, and yet the PRC is not 
complaining, they must be happy with the returns they are getting in the form of access 
and influence.  
Picking up on this weakness and a prime opportunity to influence, Collison, 
Brennan, and Rios-Morales acknowledge that China has made a specialty at funneling 
FDI into small, developed economies.98 Although these authors use a case study from 
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Ireland, there are many parallels with micro-level economics in the United States. The 
largest of which is that Chinese FDI to these communities often is a net negative for the 
investor, which of course, means there is a reason other than monetary returns on 
investments. 
Disruptive Communications 
Lance and Livingston narrow down foreign interference, though not specifically 
from China, to interference in the media, via “disruptive communications,”99 and their 
negative effects on democratic institutions. The two monitored the advertisements around 
the Brexit debate and the election of Donald Trump. They seemed genuinely surprised at 
the ease at which foreign influence was picked up and echoed by mainstream media 
organizations in both the United States in the UK, using democratic institutions against 
themselves.100 In the wake of Brexit and Trump’s election, disruptive communications 
have become the norm in both foreign and domestic-originated interference campaigns.  
Digging deeper into the use of disruptive communications and the media, Golan 
and Carroll studied the power of the opinion piece (op-ed) in newspapers of record 
worldwide. Their studies revealed that most op-ed consumers do not fully understand that 
op-eds are not vetted opinions, for the most part. The majority of op-ed readers believe 
that the publishing newspapers do some type of due diligence on the pieces, despite many 
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newspapers making it clear that they do not.101 This is a disturbing trend of confirmation 
bias. The prevalence and ease of propaganda to make it into major newspapers combined 
with the aforementioned misunderstanding of readers create an easy avenue for China to 
reach thousands or even millions with its foreign influence.  
 Transitioning to how, specifically, China attempts to influence Americans and 
ultimately U.S. policy, Golan goes beyond his study of the power of the op-ed and turns 
his focus on Chinese influence in American newspapers. Golan and Lukito found that 
China seems to have a habit of using major American newspapers to attempt to reach 
U.S. policy makers and sway them against interfering in Chinese policies and practices 
by framing China as an international power, an equal to the United States, and therefore 
legitimate in their use of their power. However, the authors note, China itself is not as 
restrained in trying to insert its policy preferences in internal U.S. policy debates via the 
op-ed.102  
American’s trust in the news media is not a new development and neither is its 
trust in China because of the news. In 1970, Yuan studied the effects of American 
audiences’ perception of China through the American media and discovered that it was 
working remarkably well in China’s favor. The majority of responders to Yuan’s survey 
had positive things to say about China or noted that China was not a threat nor would it 
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become one because it was a poor, developing country. When asked why the responders 
believed such things, the most common answer was that was what was being reported in 
the news media.103 It should be stressed that this is dated information and what was true 
50 years ago may not be true any longer. We will see later that this has changed 
dramatically.  
   Moving from the global view of Chinese and other foreign influence campaign 
factors to that of those campaigns aimed at solely the United States as a whole, Benkler, 
Faris, and Roberts believe that foreign actors, not just China, are actively using social 
media to destroy the American Creed. The authors studied possible foreign influence 
between early 2015 and the first 12 months of the Trump presidency and discovered that 
institutional, political, and cultural changes in American politics combined with 
technological changes created a perfect storm of foreign influence. Much of which was 
adopted and amplified by American media.104 
Soft Power and “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” as Disruptive Communications 
Diamond and Schell introduce us to the Chinese concept of “Wolf Warrior 
Diplomacy,” fighting a war through soft power, and how it has already infiltrated the 
U.S. government, schools, think tanks, and media at every level. They remind their 
readers that China has not been shy about publicly declaring that the U.S. and China are 
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at war and that the U.S. refuses to believe it as China goes about sowing division amongst 
Americans of all stripes.105  
Edney continues this line of thought that Chinese authorities over the past decade 
have been brazen and public about China’s growing influence in America through media 
propaganda: specifically, how China uses America’s institutions, politics, and ideals 
against themselves. One current and relevant example used by Edney is China’s desire 
for the United States to sign binding climate agreements while China joins as a signatory 
only or making “joint-international” commitments that do not call for China-specific 
domestic commitments or that put off for years or decades Chinese commitments, thus 
putting all the burdens, including that of China, on countries like America but leaving 
China to do as it pleases.106 
 Cutting to the heart of the issue of Chinese propaganda, Min and Luwei compared 
the effects of Chinese propaganda on the United States and South Korea. They 
discovered that the credibility of the delivering medium plays a huge role in how the 
message is received in the two countries. For example, advertising in mainstream media 
and newspapers of the record is received much easier than in smaller news outlets.107 It 
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would seem, at least in these two countries, that the credibility of the media matters, 
possibly signaling that consumers do not do enough of their due diligence.  
 It is not only old media that China uses its tactics to spread influence. In an 
attempt to explain the new world we live in, Hartnett discusses the 2010 case of China 
being caught stealing Google’s browser code, hacking the accounts of human rights 
activists in the United States, and planting viruses on those accounts and yet coming out 
looking like the victim and the champion of the oppressed after being bullied by the 
United States. He describes a cyber world that has been framed by China and in which 
incompetent and indelicate U.S. officials have been soundly defeated.108 It is a tale of 
how much power those countries that understand the new cyber-world order can wield 
compared to those countries that do not – it is not about who did what, rather who can 
frame the online conversation. Anyone who has watched members of the U.S. Congress 
ask questions of tech leaders knows the U.S. is way behind in this regard.109  
 Segal has a slightly different take on Chinese cyber espionage and foreign 
influence campaigns than the other authors that covered the same topic. Instead of 
influence for one-off purposes like censoring operations, Segal argues Xi is concerned 
about the following specific events: domestic stability and CCP legitimacy, global PRC 
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military power, and overtaking the United States as the primary world power. According 
to Segal, Xi sees all three are interconnected and that the CCP cannot survive as long as 
the United States is the primary power and therefore the CCP has no other option than to 
try and sway U.S. public opinion to China’s favor as a way to weaken the United 
States.110  
The New Trojan Horse: Confucius Institutes 
Building on Segal’s argument of targeted Chinese influence campaigns against 
the U.S. public, Wang considered PRC leaders’ overseas visits, Chinese media growth in 
remote locations, Confucius Institutes, global sporting events, and student scholarship 
programs as methods to promote and build pro-China public opinion in the United States. 
Like others before him, Wang theorized that China was seeing some kind of a return on 
its investment for those activities even if those events were money-losing operations.111 
Zanardi also highlights China’s use of Confucius Institutes as soft-power tools to 
sell the Chinese public image throughout the world.112 He found that the Institutes have 
one overarching theme “serve China’s political goals as they serve to benefit China’s 
worldwide reputation as a new power.”113 
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Much like the Confucius Institutes, the Chinese government uses its United Front 
Work Department, commonly referred to as the United Front, to rewrite the West’s 
narratives, perceptions, and rules to its benefit. Author Yoshihara describes the United 
Front as working to spread Beijing’s propaganda, intimidate and censor people in foreign 
countries, and shape discussions revolving around the CCP and groups critical of 
Beijing’s policies. He cites many of the CCP’s writings to back up his claims of the 
PRC’s political war and influence operations.114 
Zhang and Cameron conclude the mountain of studies and evidence of Chinese 
public relations campaigns in the United States to polish its image and pursue its foreign 
affairs goals. Specifically, the authors call out the New York Times as being overly 
beneficial and an effective mouthpiece for China despite being kicked out of China, 
compared to other U.S. newspapers. Furthermore, they, like other aforementioned 
authors, discovered that China specifically targets professors of international relations 
and family members of U.S. officials with trips to China and other non-monetary 
rewards. Again, China focuses its efforts on those who are either previously ambivalent 
or friendly to Chinese persuasions.115 China is past trying to convince its critics. 
From Virtual Reality to Reality 
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Moving from the reality of institutions to virtual reality and building on China’s 
ability to frame media conversations in the online world, Huang and Wang clarify that 
the West does not understand China’s commitment to rule the online world. Specifically, 
how China has quietly been nudging technology companies to “tell China stories well” 
by slowly imposing China’s own rules into the company’s own rules. According to the 
authors, in a speech in 2013 Chinese President Xi introduced the concept of “tell China 
stories well” and indicated that China needed to be the “power behind the throne,” of 
sorts, of Twitter. China then unleashed an army on Twitter, both to post and burnish the 
image of China but also to troll and constantly report what would be considered 
reasonable posts critical of China.116  
 Continuing the theme of Internet media manipulation by the CCP, King, Pan, and 
Roberts accuse China of the largest mass media disinformation campaign ever created. 
The authors point to the well-known and acknowledged “50 Cent Army,” millions of 
Chinese government-hired activists to troll the internet posting disinformation to 
influence political debates in favor of China. According to their research, this “army” is 
responsible for 448 million fake social media posts every year. Interestingly, they also 
claim that the most effective method for disinformation is to stay clear of China’s critics 
and only engage those who are not yet decided. Therefore, they are avoiding open and 
honest debate with those that might be better versed in countering Chinese propaganda.117  
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 Much like the way China attempts to dominate the message on Twitter through 
pure numbers, Kalathil warns that China is attempting to do the same throughout the 
entire internet: “Using a mixture of marketplace-oriented mechanisms, propaganda, 
monetary strategies, and worldwide events, China is attempting to harness and control the 
global information environment. It has focused on three main avenues: shaping global 
media, guiding the evolution of the Internet, and influencing worldwide perceptions 
through Hollywood.” 118 China’s multifaceted attempt reflects a contemporary, nuanced 
understanding of the new power in this nadir time of A.I. and technology.  
Speaking of Chinese understanding of the new A.I. technologies, Wang, Lee, Wu, 
and Shen studied what type of posts that China and China-linked posters produced and 
noticed a high percentage of images used in their posts. When they dug deeper, they 
discovered these posters were probably using images to subvert social media companies’ 
A.I. that was looking for posts that went against their terms of use. Additionally, it was 
observed that English posts were flagged more often than Chinese language posts that 
conveyed the same message.119 Again, another example of using rules and policies 
against the creator of the rules.  
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We Have Met the Enemy and They are Us: Western Pop Culture and China 
Unlike democratic and capitalist countries where pop culture is an organic thing, 
according to Mengying, the CCP tries to manufacture Chinese pop culture and spread it 
throughout the world. Although the authors mentioned many examples of this from 
producing Hollywood films and jamming them full of positive China references and 
laying claim to all pandas in the world, Mengying focuses on the translation of the 
Chinese language into other languages. Specifically, China wants to be known as the 
authoritative translator of the Mandarin language. The author believes this way China can 
control the narrative of both what comes in and out of the country,120 including different 
versions of the same document depending on the audience.  
One example of the CCP using language as a method to control the masses while 
spinning its narrative is controlling the translations of Bibles allowed in China, including 
the Bibles of foreigners. In the Bible, there is a famous story in which Jesus forgives a 
woman taken in adultery. Jesus’ point was that everyone, but him, is a sinner and if he 
can forgive someone, we all can exercise compassion and mercy because of their sins and 
despite what the law may state. In the Chinese government official translation of the 
story, Jesus stones the woman to death, claiming that despite his sins the law must be 
followed.121 No one is perfect therefore you should look to the CCP and its laws as the 
ultimate arbitrator of justice, and, of course, Jesus is not perfect nor a god.   
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Growing Astroturf: Disinformation and Social Media Campaigns 
Moreover, continuing the research of China’s social media army and perhaps 
societies’ resistance to it, Zhao and DeDeo studied China’s use of A.I. and “bots” to 
create the imitation of grass-roots consensus on social media and found some degree of 
hope against Internet-based foreign influence. The authors label this fake agreement 
building “Astroturf.”122  They noted in their studies that China has increasingly been 
exporting its A.I. and bots out of the Great Firewall and onto the Internet to control the 
dialogue about China.123  However, the Chinese use of bots has yet been to the point that 
it is so prevalent that it has caused concern. According to the authors, most social media 
sites believe they are an annoyance to either be ignored or just a cost of business when 
dealing with China, even though they found over “18,000 Chinese Astroturf accounts” 
and it was likely that 94 percent of all China-based social media accounts operating 
outside of China were bots.124  These bot accounts were found to mainly focus on 
censoring or influencing discussions about topics that were also censored inside the Great 
Firewall.125  In other words, China was attempting to surreptitiously create a normative 
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Zhao and DeDeo, despite the great resources China puts into this program, it is 
“remarkably ineffective” as these bots, as sophisticated as they are, have yet to figure out 
how to reach a wide audience.126  Perhaps users either do not go to their favorite social 
media applications for geopolitical news or they just ignore what they do see. 
What Does It All Mean? 
 Tian, Xie, Wang, and Wang argue that China is the victim of Western trade and 
economic aggression and Chinese appeals in Western media is an effort to level the 
playing field through the only means it has.127 This seems like a stretch as foreign media 
is already highly regulated within China. There is a difference between regulating what is 
shared in your own country and attempting to influence another country in their country. 
Additionally, according to the authors, the forced technology transfer of Western 
companies operating in China is not a problem because Western countries could do the 
same to Chinese companies operating in those countries if they wanted to. The authors 
believe that it is not China’s fault Western countries do not do this.128 
Despite Tian, Xie, Wang, and Wang’s argument, the majority of research that has 
been done to this point points to a clear conclusion that China takes advantage of Western 
norms and institutions to spread its influence. As was noted above, influence methods 
like FDI and pop culture are hardly Chinese innovations and are not always intended to 
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influence though they do. The same goes for more modern media outlets and platforms. 
And this is the brilliance of Chinese social engineering – taking what was created to 
entertain, improve, and connect people and turn it into a method of influencing country-
level policies. Researchers have studied how China has methodically used DFI, 
disruptive communications in major media, using soft power to infiltrate U.S. education 
systems via Confucius Institutes and United Front dealings, and finally turning social 
media platforms into the ultimate of fake news. 
China is actively engaged in ubiquitous campaigns to spread its influence 
throughout the U.S. media. However, the United States has not been completely negligent 
about Chinese propaganda through FDI and media manipulation. According to 
Kirkegaard, Chinese investments in the United States reached a peak in 2016. The 
decline in investments since 2016 is due, in part, to increased scrutiny into Chinese 
investments, media deals, and SOE operating in America. It also has to do with a finite 
supply of investment money and what seems to be the Chinese growing interest in 
investments in Europe post-2016, where lax investment laws and regulations are allowing 
China to gain incredible influence there. However, the author finds that Europe too is 
starting to clamp down on Chinese foreign influence through investment.129  
Despite the efforts of Chinese influence in the United States, the tide may be 
turning. Younis cites March 2021 polling from the Gallup Corporation that 45 percent of 
Americans now call China the number one enemy of the United States. This is up double 
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from 2020 with most responders citing the COVID-19 pandemic, economic issues, and 
perceived Chinese human rights abuses.130  
 China’s methods of foreign influence are so well documented and yet it continues 
unabated. Most of the aforementioned studies and research above make it clear that China 
is very adept at using open society's media, both traditional and social media, against it; 
finding loopholes in regulation and flattering with the almighty dollar to bribe media 
companies into going against their long-term interests. Cook’s Freedom House report 
accuses that in a world of unfettered capitalism, shrinking media budgets, and the 
exponential growth of media alternatives, media outlets will not restrict themselves when 
offered money – no matter the source.131 It should be noted that U.S. media corporations 
are good at reporting FARA incidents; however, it is unclear how in-depth U.S. media 
vetted money and advertisement dollars that come from SOE.132 
What is Next? 
Although most of the research into this concerning phenomenon is centered 
around global and U.S.-focused major newspapers and social media applications, there 
were some mentions of smaller, more rural media outlets in the United States that have 
been equally affected by Chinese money. Why would this be? Why would a country with 
seemingly endless amounts of influence money spend it on rural America, what is the 
ultimate return on investment? It was noted earlier that China has, in the last decade or 
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so, changed whom it targets, those that are either already pro-China or those that are 
undecided about China. Who better fits that description than those American blue-collar 
workers who do not have a lot of discretionary time to look into the intricacies of the 
manipulative nature of Chinese advertisements in their hometown newspapers; yet have a 
penchant for speaking out to their elective representatives because they have not yet 
become jaded like there big city contemporaries? In the eyes of the PRC, middle America 
probably seems like a bargain on its return on investment of media dollars.  
While China has been attacking at every angle of American media, it has also 
found a niche market that has been neglected and ripe for manipulation. It has been no 
secret that American rural communities have been hurting economically due to brain 
drain and capital flight from small-town America to America’s big cities. According to 
Bailey, Jensen, and Ransom, this void has left an opening for foreign influence, one of 
which China seems happy to fill, at least in part.133 
 We now turn to investigate this phenomenon. Why China would spend time and 
money in rural America and the effects this media manipulation has on federal policies. 
For this, we will study the curious case of China in Iowa.  
Targeting the Heartland 
Chinese interest in rural America is not new. Indeed, Iowa and China have been 
linked by trade for some time. Between 2008 and 2017, Iowa exports to China grew by 
39 percent while exports of goods to China from the rest of the world decreased by 
negative 5 percent. During that same timeframe, Iowan exports of services to China grew 
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at an amazing 497 percent, while the rest of the world was at a comparably tame 65 
percent. In 2016, the China market was second only to the Canadian market for Iowa 
agriculture products.134 China imported nearly $154 billion worth of goods from the U.S. 
in 2017, therefore Iowa’s $2.5 billion of that seems paltry but not to Iowa when looked at 
the micro-level. Iowa was heavily dependent on the Chinese market to sell its oilseeds 
and grain, meat products, and other agricultural commodities is credited in creating 
23,600 Iowa jobs, nearly 2 percent of all Iowa jobs.135 If Iowa sees China as a growth 
opportunity, it would seem that China understands this.  
Countries are not in the business of doing what is best for other countries at the 
cost of their people. In the global economy today, countries via for market position 
through comparative and competitive advantages. There is a reason why China imports 
products from Iowa and China also has a reputation of allowing foreign industries into 
the country, learning, and then adopting those practices, and then domestic industries 
crowd out the foreign competitor.136 This leaves the foreign company not only without 
the China market but also without its intellectual property (IP).  
China does not stop at forced IP transfer from within China. It also has earned a 
reputation as a top-rate purveyor of economic espionage and stealing trade secrets, and 
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American agricultural products have not missed their attention.137 Although the theft of 
American agricultural IP goes back to the heart of the Cold War138, China has been 
thought to have started in earnest in the early 2010s. Since that time, the U.S. Department 
of Justice has earned multiple convictions of Chinese nationals attempting to steal genetic 
code or actual samples of U.S. agricultural products, nearly 7 percent of all Chinese 
nationals convicted in the U.S. of some type of espionage since 2010. According to 
Genoways, the U.S. and China are in the midst of a high-stakes battle to be the world’s 
breadbasket.139 This is not just about feeding a nation, which China is struggling to do 
and a boost from American IP would be greatly beneficial, but about commanding a 
powerful foreign policy tool, and Iowan farmers are caught in the middle. 
Mr. Xi Goes to Iowa 
Why would one of China’s largest newspapers, China’s Daily, an SOE and 
official publication of the PRC, be interested in taking out an advertisement in the form 
of an insert in an Iowan newspaper with a daily circulation of approximately only 30,000 
and is on the verge of ceasing print editions.140 The Des Moines Register may be the 
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pride of the publishing world in the Hawkeye State but major international newspapers 
are not clamoring to advertise in it, let alone taking out a 4-page spread like the Daily did 
in September 2018.141 One would be easily forgiven to overlook the “China Watch” 
supplement as an insignificant event as it was specifically designed to look like a 
legitimate news article.  
For years, China has run “China Watch” sections in the major American 
newspapers the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to influence public opinion. 
U.S. officials have labeled “China Watch” a “broad malign influence campaign”142 in the 
United States. “They [China] employ a whole of government approach using political, 
economic, commercial, military, and information tools to influence U.S. public 
opinion.”143 In 2018, “China Watch” came for rural America.  
The advert consisted of the following: “One quasi-article in the advert was the 
story of Xi Jinping’s trip to Iowa in the 1980s. Another section informed the reader of 
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advert, the article “Duel Undermines Benefits of Trade” explains to “Iowans the trade 
war between China and the United States was the fault of President Trump and it hurt the 
economy of Iowa. Furthermore, with U.S. midterm elections only 6 weeks away at the 
time, the advert suggested that perhaps the good people of Iowa should consider the trade 
war in their voting preferences.”145 Of course, the price for putting articles critical of 
China’s leader in a local newspaper would be going to prison.146 
According to prominent China-watcher Chris Chappell, “Placing propaganda in 
an Iowan newspaper is one small piece of the CCP’s plan to undermine rural support for 
the Trump Administration and its tough trade policies concerning China. It also takes 
advantage of America’s democratic process and free press.”147 He continues “the Chinese 
regime wanted people in Iowa to read it and probably believed that it was a small enough 
newspaper that it would not make waves outside of Iowa. China probably did not expect 
that the maneuver would eventually make its way to President Trump.” “China is actually 
placing propaganda ads in the Des Moines Register and other papers, made to look like 
news,” Trump tweeted.148  
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There are reasons Iowa gets all the presidential hopefuls, it is critical in 
presidential elections. The U.S. announced $2 billion of additional tariffs on Chinese 
imports. According to President Trump, “The U.S. tariffs were meant to be a response to 
years of unfair trade practices by China”149 and “state-sponsored intellectual property 
theft.”150 An example of this theft is Chinese spies stealing corn seeds from Iowa; which 
the insert did not make a note of despite around the same time the sentencing to prison of 
a Chinese national for stealing corn seeds from Iowa.151  
Chappell continued his analysis that the feature article in the insert, “Duel 
Undermines Benefits of Trade,” threatened Iowans that the Chinese could cut out Iowa 
altogether and get their soybeans from Brazil. It continues with blaming U.S. politicians 
for the trade war and not so subtly warning against voting for someone that would 
support the trade war.152  
Iowa first established trade ties to China in the 1970s, at the time the Des Moines 
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relations have flourished with the University of Iowa boasting 10 percent of its student 
population as Chinese. Furthermore, these foreign students reportedly contribute 
approximately $170 million to the local economy.154  
After Xi visited Muscatine, Iowa, in 1985, the small city saw a boom in Chinese 
investment. A group of Chinese officials most recently visited Muscatine in 2018 to 
“check on conditions” about the trade war.155 It sounds like the perfect place for the CCP 
to start changing U.S. policies through the infiltration of the local economy. 
Did It Work? 
If China did intend to use a rural American newspaper to sway public opinion to 
the point that it changed U.S. federal policies the question comes down to, did it work? 
The answer is difficult, complicated, and not straightforward; and, most likely not 
answerable with yes or no. This is due to the lack of data and research on the topic.  
The then U.S. Ambassador to China and former Governor of Iowa, Terry 
Branstad, claimed that “China Watch” was “doubling down on [their] bullying by 
running propaganda ads in our free press.”156 Furthermore, President Trump responded to 
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the insert by tweeting, “We are beating them on Trade, opening markets, and the farmers 
will make a fortune when this is over!”157 
According to the Register, “the farmers in Muscatine were concerned about 
things like intellectual property theft and supported the U.S. taking a stronger stand”158 
and that Iowans “may not appreciate trying to be manipulated by a foreign 
government.”159  
From both the literature review and the subsequent study of non-academic 
sources, it is clear that the only consequence of the “China Watch” advertising in the 
Register was angering Trump more, probably causing him to double down on his China 
trade policies. In that regard, the advert was a failure. However, it may have had a 
significant impact on other federal policies or federal race outcomes.  
The advert ran roughly 2 months before the 2018 mid-term elections. The 
elections had the following outcomes, which analysts and experts had difficulty 
interpreting because of the split ticket nature of the outcome:  
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• In the congressional races, however, voters were more concerned about national-
level policies and this is where Chinese influence may have been felt. According 
to the Register, “trade and tariffs passed down by the Trump Administration 
rocked the state’s agricultural economy”160 and this may have been the reason that 
Democrats picked up three of the state’s four congressional seats, unseating two 
incumbent Republicans in doing so. However, Pfannenstiel made it clear in her 
article that this conclusion is speculation as “a lack of exit polling in Iowa makes 
it difficult to say for sure.”161 Iowan exit polls did discover that 52 percent of 
Iowan voters had unfavorable views of Trump while 45 percent had favorable, 
with the suburbs of Des Moines going against Trump-affiliated candidates.162  
• The Iowa Governor’s race was won by a Republican, who focused on the 
privatization of Medicaid, state-level tax cuts, and curbing access to abortions. 
Iowans did not take into account a trade war or Chinese friendship overtures at the 
highest level of state politics.  
• Similar to the Governor’s race, Republicans won the offices of secretary of state 
and agriculture. One would think that the Secretary of Agriculture would be a 
state-level office that should be affected by an agricultural trade war. 
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Likely the safest way to interpret these results is that Iowans separated state-level 
Republicans from national-level Republicans and their respective policies.  
Interestingly, in the 2020 elections, Republicans stormed back and won three of the 
four congressional seats, equaling what it had before the 2018 mid-term election. This is 
another curious outcome as the trade war had not abated. It is possible that the lack of 
Chinese interference in the 2020 elections made the difference for Republicans but then 
again, the 2020 election cycle had a lot of anomalies to it.  
One very fascinating result of the 2020 congressional election in Iowa District 2 was 
that a Republican won the open seat which had previously been filled by a Democrat for 
seven consecutive terms. In this, there is no evidence of Chinese propaganda backfiring 
but there is also no evidence of the now 3-year-old propaganda hurting the Trump-
affiliated candidate. 
However, until the trade war is settled, China’s billions of dollars of retaliatory 
tariffs could mean pain for Iowa’s exporters of soy, corn, and beef. “The tariffs and 
counter-tariffs we are enduring in this trade war with China and the U.S. are having a real 
impact on Iowa farmers.”163 According to an Iowa State University study, Iowa farmers 
were projected to lose up to $2.2 billion from Chinese counter-tariffs. According to John 
Crespi, an economics professor at Iowa State and co-author of the study, “Is that a lot? 
Yeah, that is a big number.”164 Specifically, Crespi noted that Iowa’s soybean industry 
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could lose up to $891 million, and the corn industry could lose as much as $9 million. 
Former U.S. National Security Council spokesperson Tommy Vietor called China’s 
target tariffs a “Pretty savvy political play being run by China” for targeting Iowa with 
tariffs on corn, soy, pork, and other agricultural products that hurt midwestern farmers, 
conveniently also the people who tend to vote for Trump and Republicans.165 
Conclusion 
 Even though China runs paid advertisements in major U.S. newspapers the choice 
to place its propaganda in the Des Moines Register highlights China’s interest in what 
Abigale Grace calls “subnational outreach.”166 This, combined with China’s other 
subnational activities like Confucius Institutes, United Front work, and some of the Belt 
and Road Initiative activities in rural areas of the United States constitutes a real threat in 
the form of foreign influence to U.S. policies. China has targeted state and local 
governments because they are less likely to be attuned to the wider implications of 
Chinese influence campaigns. 
With operations specializing in influence at the micro-level, rather than what the 
Russians have done by focusing on national elections, China desires to influence 
Americans’ view of China at the individual level. The end for both Russian and Chinese 
influence operations is the same even though the scale and scope are different. China is 
content to take things slow, start at the bottom and work its way to the top while Russia is 
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heavier-handed. But even though the blows do not land all at once or as heavy, China’s 
activities of turning the U.S. political, media, and economic systems against themselves 
constitute an existential threat to those systems, the American Creed, and American 
ideology.   
 Unfortunately, aside from correlative circumstantial evidence, there just is not 
enough research and empirical evidence to unequivocally say that China is trying to use 
rural media and newspapers to influence United States federal policies. An accusation of 
this level must be beyond private opinions and requires more research or, if the federal 
government has more concrete evidence of Chinese influence operations, it must be 
declassified and released publicly, or at the very least provided to Congress if it cannot be 
unclassified.167 The U.S. government determined that China decided not to interfere in 
the 2020 election;168 therefore, it has had plenty of time to determine if Chinese 
advertisements in an Iowa newspaper were enough to influence policy.  
 Despite the lack of direct evidence of actual policy tampering, there is no doubt 
that Chinese influence operations have matured and are sophisticated enough that 
American academic, political, and media classes would rather talk about Russia’s 
obvious influence attempts and ignore China’s veiled influence operations.  
Exposing Chinese influence and its maturing neo-imperial and neo-colonial 
practices will be an incredibly politically hard task because so much money and 
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important people are involved.169 However, the American ideals of freedom of expression 
and speech are worth any price and cannot be compromised by foreign influences, 
otherwise, the rest of the American ideals, like free and fair elections and democracy, will 
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Chapter 3: Doomed to Repeat History: Chinese Neo-Imperialism and the Revival of 
the Tribute System 
“Opportunities multiply as they are seized.”170 
Some argue that modern history began around 200 years ago with the American 
Revolution and that the West has molded and shaped the world order ever since. The very 
definition of modernity was being Western. However, what would happen if developing 
countries no longer looked to the West for leadership in cultural and economic aspects? 
What if a non-Western country became a regional hegemon? A global hegemon? In this 
new era, China could be the predominant norm setter. 
In this chapter, it will be argued that no matter the amount of engagement and 
accommodation, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will not conform to international 
norms and will push for either its own, special norms or new global norms to better 
reflect its priorities. the results of this non-conformity will have far-reaching and 
significant economic, political, and cultural ramifications. 
The CCP’s goals are as large as China’s geography and population. These goals 
are different from the conventional Western state which values a traditional world order. 
The CCP believes that China’s ascendancy is assured as the Middle Kingdom and the 
center of “the old tributary system.”171 If this system could be newly reborn as ancient 
Chinese ideas of superiority begin to reassert themselves. Kevin Alfred Strom wrote that 
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one must only look at whom they are not allowed to criticize to know who the true master 
is.172 As China continues its unfettered rise despite global, or at least globally agreed 
upon, norms in human, civil, and intellectual property rights, it will usher in an end for 
Western-definition dominance of those norms. 
In addition to China’s neo-imperial aspirations and actions, this chapter will 
reveal that the current era in Chinese history is more reminiscent of the pre-modern 
tributary system than not. China transcends the modern understanding of what is 
expected of a state. The slow understanding by the West will cause major impacts 
throughout the world’s political, economic, and cultural norms, possibly causing a 
divergence and the acceptance of two sets of norms. 
Outline 
This chapter studies the effects of a transcendent China, a China that is a major 
world power if not the world power, and the effects that China’s neo-imperialist growth 
strategy will have on the world order and Western values. That China is a substitute for 
Western norms and values and its primary weapon, its economy, is used as a 
sophisticated propaganda system. It will also deliver an analytical approach to China’s 
rise and its strategy of neo-imperialism. Forecasting techniques and case studies are 
applied to compare and discover the prospects of China’s rise. 
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A review of previous academic research on this topic follows, presented in a 
topic-by-topic manner. The review will start with studies focused on neo-imperialism, 
including case studies of possible Chinese neo-imperialism in Africa and a side-by-side 
comparison of Chinese and U.S. neo-imperialist actions, arguments that despite 
blustering China is not in a position to change norms, and finally, arguments that China 
will indeed be predominate. After establishing the historical studies, there will be an in-
depth analysis of the findings and a synthesis of examples and more current events. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the findings and how they continue to advance and 
recommendations for future and continued study. 
Picking Up Where It Left Off, Neo-Imperialism in Africa 
Lumumba-Kasongo studied the Africa-China economic relationship since the 
1990s and discovered that despite the prevalent thinking of two developing regions aiding 
one another, the opposite was true - China was taking economic and political advantage 
of Africa. Using case studies of previous imperial and colonialist actions and empirical 
data of Chinese export and imports with Africa, Lumumba-Kasongo found little 
difference between the actions of Western colonialists and that of more recent Chin neo-
colonialism.173 
Not unlike Lumumba-Kasongo, Adrian Hadland also used a historical evaluation 
to try and determine whether China’s actions in Africa should be considered neo-
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imperialist.174 He focused on contrasting the 1880 to the 1915-colonial timeframe to 
Chinese modern actions in Africa. Hadland concluded that “the multiple agendas of the 
actors and the role of ‘compradors’ through to patterns of investment and financing”175 
were nearly identical between the two eras.176 Indeed, it seems that the CCP has studied 
past methods of exploiting Africa and has reused them. 
Alfred Zack-Williams produced a very in-depth study on neo-imperialism and 
African development. He opined that when people think of imperialism, they give too 
much credit to military intervention and operations, and that “imperialist subjugation of 
the continent… has been less overt, occurring through the sphere of market subjugation, 
transfer pricing, profits repatriation and asymmetrical economic partnering agreement 
leading to deep integration, which may become too restrictive for African 
Governments.”177 Zack-Williams discovered that Chinese actions in less developed 
countries were likely to fall within the definition of neo-imperialism. Zack-Williams even 
goes as far as calling the “construction of railways, harbors, roads, and mines the 
imperialist center of the bourgeois imperialism.”178 Although he does not say it, there is 
 
174 Adrian Hadland, “If the Hat Fits: Revisiting Chinese “Neo-Imperialism” in 
Africa from a Comparative Historical Perspective,” Asian Politics & Policy 4, no. 4 
(2012): accessed June 12, 2021, doi:10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01372.x, p.471. 
175 Ibid., 85. 
176 Ibid., 85. 
177 Alfred Zack-Williams, “Neo-imperialism and African Development,” Review 
of African Political Economy 40, no. 136 (2013): accessed June 12, 2021, 
doi:10.1080/03056244.2013.797759, p.179. 
178 Ibid., 184. 
77 
 
only one country currently doing these construction projects en mass in the developing 
world and that is China. Accusing China of being both bourgeois and imperial is a heavy 
accusation, cutting to the very core of what the CCP says it is not. 
Solomon Lai Okajare examines Chinese engagements in Africa and believes that 
it will cause a jealous reaction from the West. As this “Sino-Western rivalry” intensifies, 
Okajare believes that China will continue to pour economic resources into Africa in an 
attempt to outspend the West, which is supposedly content with an increase in diplomacy 
but not economic stimulus.179 China’s spending will cause a “skewed international 
economic system” in Africa as they rely on China for monetary support and becomes a 
revival of the historic Chinese tribute system.180  
More than Just Africa 
Khushboo Ejaz highlights China’s growing economic power to enslave, smaller, 
more developing nations in what he describes as a “neo-imperialist strategy.”181 In his 
study, he contrasts China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC), with that of historical imperialism in Pakistan and as being 
completely beneficial for China while having decidedly mixed results for Pakistan. 
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Indeed, Ejaz leaves no doubt where he stands on the topic with his declaration “The 
objective of this paper is to argue that CPEC is more a neo-imperialist strategy of China 
which might not create win-win outcomes.”182 He concludes that China is using 
economic neo-imperialism to control Pakistan’s strategically important territory.183 Much 
like the U.S.S.R. strove to have an Indian Ocean port via Pakistan. It is hard to argue 
Ejaz’s conclusions as China and the BRI have a history of debt-trap diplomacy.184 
  Masako Ikegami agrees with Ejaz and sees China’s problem as more than just an 
Africa issue, it is a fundamental CCP issue. He believes China does not understand how 
to peaceably grow; that the CCP’s revolutionary mindset makes conflict inevitable. 
Unlike other power nations, according to Ikegami, China is continuously creating 
disputes and instability whenever it has foreign relations, including with other 
authoritarian regimes.185 Ikegami claims that if there is a new Cold War between the 
West and China, it is because the CCP does not behave within the prevailing norms of 
international relations and accuses China of using a neo-imperial method of investment or 
“economic cooperation” to fuel its expansionistic goals. Ikegami believes this is because 
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China is incredibly “politically vulnerable.”186 To overcome this weakness, Ikegami 
contrasts modern China with pre-World War II Japan; both have “a large investment in 
economic infrastructure or extracting natural resources, military interventions for 
protecting economic interests, and social-political absorption employing puppet 
governments.”187 He forecasts that it could lead to the same outcome as pre-World War II 
Japan.188  
Zhang Caiguo and Liu Shou-yi, in separate studies, respectively looked at the 
roots of neo-imperialism and defined it as unilateralist and foreign influence in nature - 
imposing one country’s values on another country and interfering in the domestic policies 
and decisions of the latter country.189190 Liu interestingly goes a little bit further than 
Zhang and finds that neo-imperialism is based upon a “materialistic foundation.”191 
Although this may sound quite ideological, it fits well with China’s BRI that is ostensibly 
focused on economic growth. Although neither Zhang nor Liu do not specifically study 
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China, based on their findings, China would fit well into their models of what neo-
imperialists are doing. 
Bin Yu begins his research with a quote from Lenin, “Imperialism... is the 
separation of ownership from the people” and goes on to compare Lenin’s definition to 
more recent actions.192 According to Bin, the key factor on whether imperialism is 
occurring is money being exchanged for physical resources, labor, or access to territory 
and specifically labels the exchange of those resources for IOUs the height of neo-
imperialism.193 With China’s BRI model using IOUs and the aforementioned debt-trap 
diplomacy in the form of massive Chinese loans to developing nations, Bin would likely 
agree that China is currently the largest conveyor of neo-imperialism according to his 
definition. 
Morag M. Kersel and Christina Luke studied the resurgence of historical claims 
and traditions as evidence of neo-imperialism. These historical claims, or cultural states, 
are fueling a rise of neo-imperialism as nations attempt to claw back what they believed 
was theirs.194 The authors found that instead of “open and honest dialogue” between the 
parties, the neo-imperialist side is increasingly tempted to use their military, political, or 
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economic might to take what they believe belonged to them.195 Again, as the other 
researchers noted above, Kersel and Luke do not specifically call out China but their 
findings seem to indict the current aggressive economic and military actions of China as 
neo-imperialist. 
Ruan Zongze has a different viewpoint than his contemporaries. Instead of 
focusing on Chinese neo-imperialism or U.S. hegemony, he compares the two side-by-
side and finds that they are not all that different in their respective neo-imperialism.196 
Perhaps that is why the two countries are finding it so difficult to work together, perhaps 
they are too alike? Ruan’s conclusions highlight that the two “seek absolute hegemony, 
[global] leadership, security, and military superiority.”197 He continues that neo-
imperialism has deep traditions in the respective countries’ historical and current 
developments and presently both use a form of foreign engagement to sway their 
respective targets, though both counties supposedly are not above using isolation, 
containment, or even preemptive strike to get what they want. Ruan closes his study with 
a warning that both countries may suffer the same failure that other imperialist regimes 
have had with overexpansion.198 
Zhang Yao followed Ruan’s thesis of the neo-imperial similarities of the U.S. and 
China and added that the two are also similar in geographic resources, both think they 
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have divine right to rule, and international hegemonic norms default to a bi-polar 
world.199 Where Zhang and Ruan diverge is that Zhang does not believe neo-imperialism 
in and of itself is sufficient to create a new world order or challenge existing norms as, 
eventually, the rest of the world will reject a country that tries to employ neo-
imperialism.200 
It’s Not a Problem, is It? 
As noted above, some researchers acknowledge China’s aggressive behaviors but 
do not think China can evolve global norms by itself. David Alton takes on the theory of 
the end of Western history and the beginning of China’s world order. Alton began his 
research that others who believed this theory were too focused on political anecdotes of 
the West’s loss of power and China’s rise in the areas of population numbers, economic 
production, and cultural wealth. He believes the theory in and of itself was anti-China or 
a desire to pull China down. He noted that the world was too diverse and that Western 
societies that were used to the freedom of thought, action, and speech would ever allow 
one country, whether it be China or any other, to be the sole fountain of values, even 
though the U.S. came close. Alton put the odds of this happening as “not historically 
probable” as there was no demand for a unipolar values world. 201 Indeed, Alton believes 
the CCP has no desire to rule the world as the current system is working very well for it 
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and being in charge also means you take all the blame. He continues that because China 
is not a nation-state or multi-nation state, rather, it is a “civilization state,” there is no real 
need for democracy for its people and it would not succeed in pressing its norms as it 
does not have the requisite background to do so - authoritarian governments work for 
civilization states but not ruling over a diversified group.202 
Alton’s take is surprisingly missing important considerations like how human 
rights, or lack thereof, in China affects human rights in other countries or that China may 
be missing a more global view but that may not stop them from trying. Which would 
have its knock-on effects. He may be forgiven for not knowing that since his study, China 
has annexed territories of Southeast Asian countries.203 However, as of the time he wrote, 
he should have known that being Chinese was more than being from the Han-dominated 
ethnic group. Especially for such diverse and diasporic people as would be labeled as 
Chinese ethnicity - Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Cantonese, and those from non-
Han majority ancestry. These groups are specific nations exactly because of the opposite 
of what Alton says, they were historically not a part of the Chinese civilization state. 
Gian Casadio’s study focuses on modern China’s “geopolitical and 
socioeconomic factors” while agreeing with the other academics that China’s long history 
makes it different and stands apart from that of the Western countries.204 One factor that 
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Casadio delves into that the others do not is that throughout China’s long history, it has 
survived off of international trade or trade-like mechanisms (like the tribute system), and 
it cannot survive without it (trade or tribute).205 Casadio, like Alton, subsequently 
challenges the theory of the inevitable rise of China but for a separate reason than 
Alton’s. The West’s flexibility is its greatest asset; the ability to change will allow its 
values to survive despite a gain in China's overall power. Furthermore, Casadio aims at 
many of China’s structural problems that were created by political agendas, not market-
driven forces. He specifically cites “increasingly aging population and low birth rate, a 
dramatic gender imbalance and overinvestment and too much dependence on exports.”206 
Casadio predicted these issues in 2013 and recently they have made the news.207 China’s 
rise, according to Casadio, is far from certain and it could just as easily backslide into a 
developing nation as it could rise to new world order.208  
Additionally, Xavier Richet takes a very novel approach against the China-rise 
theory. His argument is more of a “will the boat sink the water” perspective in which the 
CCP may inadvertently sabotage its industries so that they become less competitive by 
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pushing them to do too much too fast.209 Richet adds that China’s increasing jingoistic 
actions and words on the global stage while pushing its industries, for example, the 
CCP’s efforts with Huawei (which will be discussed later in this study), will turn off once 
receptive host nations.210 
It is Inevitable, isn’t It? 
And then there are a few academics who believe that China’s concept of world 
order is certain and the sooner the West realizes it has already lost the civilization war, 
the better it will be for everyone. Zhu Dongli argued that the Chinese model of modernity 
is unavoidable and is the “culmination” because the Western model is not sustainable.211 
Zhu believes that the “world is currently on the eve of fundamental change. The decline 
of the [American] world hegemony may reshape the way of human development and 
modernization in [next] 100 years” and that only China is positioned correctly to lead the 
world into a state of “global socialism.”212 Zhu’s argument rests on his confidence that 
Western values rely on colonization - that Western countries enjoy their freedoms 
because of production and manufacturing models created in cheap labor countries and 
that value freedoms cannot continue if the field was level. 
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Much like Zhu, Jeffery Barlow’s research led him to believe that the West only 
currently has the upper hand because of colonialism and that Western society and norms 
are not uniquely superior to Chinese, only through force of arms and economic 
manipulations have they become norms. Nevertheless, Barlow tempers his 
obsequiousness of Chinese political abilities by noting that China has done itself no 
favors by adopting Maoism, which he labeled as an extremist ideology and could blind 
the CCP to its weaknesses and could lead to further conflict with the rest of the world. 
Still. Barlow believes such conflict would only be a small setback and the end of the 
West is close at hand and should be expected.213 
Academics and researchers seem to be evenly split between China possibly 
becoming a world power and global norm-maker and failing to do so. But what is not in 
question is that China is exhibiting neo-imperialist behavior in Africa and other locations, 
and it is spreading quickly. What follows is more current evidence of Chinese behaviors 
that reinforces this theory.  
Elite Capture 
Many elites around the world work more for the CCP than their own countries.214 
Hardly a month goes by without another prominent U.S. academic being investigated for 
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working for the Chinese government.215  These elites take a shallow view of what 
constitutes their self-interest and do not consider the long-term effects of their short-term 
decisions. Indeed, they are for sale to the highest bidder and there is no bidder with 
deeper pockets than the CCP. The elite are elite because they have a defining quality or 
merit, something that sets them apart. However, sometimes they can be too clever for 
their good, often with disastrous consequences for the non-elite. 
One example is that elites pushed for China to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The American public was told by the American elite that China needed to be 
allowed to join the WTO as it would benefit the everyday American by bringing down 
the costs of goods from China while opening the Chinese market to American goods. But 
the true cost of the Chinese WTO membership was hidden, and now, China has a near-
monopoly on critical manufacturing.216 However, possibly the biggest lie that elites told 
was that a liberalized Chinese market would eventually liberalize Chinese politics.217 It 
has since been discovered that is not true and shortsighted elites continue to trade their 
integrity for the Shangri-La of the Chinese market.218  
These same elites covered up and continued to cover up, the migration of 
American jobs to China and the creation of a whole host of new problems. Including the 
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national security implications of a hostile regime controlling worldwide critical supply 
chains.219 Now, markets worldwide are so bound to China extraction is impossible 
without severely damaging one’s home market. Furthermore, the CCP has used this 
newfound power to not only not liberalize its politics, but to become more authoritarian. 
Interestingly, one of the reasons the elites were exposed was because an elite was 
cannibalized by his own for trying to stand up to China. In 2019, NBA executive Daryl 
Morey tweeted support for Hong Kong protestors in the face of Chinese oppression. His 
seemingly innocuous tweet caused the CCP to ban the NBA from airing games in China. 
This, in turn, caused the NBA to force a retraction from Morey and some of the NBA's 
biggest talents to label him as “uneducated.”220 These retractions and personal attacks 
were not aired or streamed directly to the Chinese market; they were first made on 
American soil. A man was attacked for uttering support for democracy because it 
threatened the CCP. This episode exposed the hypocrisy of several NBA players whose 
very livelihood is tied directly to the everyday fan that could be crushed by the Chinese 
regime. 
This is but one example of how American elites seem to care more about 
protecting their profits over the system that allowed them to become the richest and most 
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powerful in the first place. This also teaches that the CCP’s brand of authoritarianism has 
reached a victory over liberal democracy - they can control the very speech of the elite 
anywhere in the world and not just in China. 
More recently, the CCP, using an American elite as a puppet, has once again 
come to light. Or rather, the media made sure that every American would see one of their 
cultural elite kowtowing to the CCP.221 Movie star John Cena was making the interview 
rounds for one of his new movies and he noted that Taiwan is a country. To most in the 
West, the innocuous slip of the tongue by an action movie star would not be a big deal, 
certainly not newsworthy. But the CCP immediately threatened to disallow the movie to 
be shown in mainland China, which caused Cena to produce an apology video, begging 
for the movie to be allowed, and eliciting a stream of approval from Chinese media.222 He 
allowed his speech to be censored by the CCP. 
Another example of putting profits above convictions and bowing to the CCP 
would be the actions of major companies like clothier H&M. H&M initially released 
statements that they would certify that Chinese Uighur slaves were not used in the 
production of its products. In response, the CCP removed the company’s products from 
all Chinese online sites and its physical retail stores from online map applications. H&M 
quickly folded to the CCP’s demands.223 Because of the amount of money tied up 
 
221 John Feng, “Chinese Media Calls John Cena’s Apology “an Example for Other 




223 Elizabeth Paton, “H&M Responds to a Firestorm in China over Xinjiang 
Cotton.,” New York Times, March 31, 2021, accessed June 12, 2021, 
90 
 
between Western companies and China, it would be nearly impossible for a company to 
be expected to weather the onslaught by itself. 
Whenever one of America’s elite bows to the CCP’s pressure by denouncing 
freedom of speech it hurts all Americans. This is another data point that American values 
can be bought and sold. But what if there was a price to be paid for selling one’s values to 
a foreign government? What if by promoting the values of the CCP, Cena or the NBA 
had to register as acting as a foreign agent? In the examples used above, they are acting in 
the interests and from the pressure of the CCP. In both cases, they are nothing more than 
propagandists trying to protect their interests at the cost of their fellow countrymen and 
the cost of their supposed values. 
In the end, Cena’s, H&M’s, and the NBA’s stories say more about America than 
it does about China. The CCP is more committed to its values than America is to its own. 
It underscores the flaws and rots at the heart of uncontained capitalism and liberal 
democracy. Without true values, beyond profits, to guide, they are nothing. Furthermore, 
it begs the question of what is so wrong with Western culture that elite persons and 
companies feel the need to undermine their own espoused values and ultimately their 
long-term interests. 
The Chinese government has realized that it can weaponize America’s elite 
against itself. What started as an experiment of using Western policies against the 
Chinese has backfired. The CCP has taken Western values, corrupted them, and returned 






authoritarian state.224 Chinese professors even joke about stealing the West’s intellectual 
property rights to then turn around and drive the West out of that technology.225 When 
this first occurred, it was all over the internet; now, references and articles are difficult to 
find. 
Every time one of the elites, whether a person or company, bows to Chinese 
pressure to self-censure it harms the ability of any American to stand up against the 
demands. The CCP has taken America’s greed and selfishness and used them against 
itself. In the end, Western culture is being absorbed by the authoritarian culture of the 
CCP. If you cannot freely express your feelings about China while you are physically 
located outside of China, then you are not truly free. You have no freedom of expression. 
And the elite of Western society is leading the way; if they do not awaken to their 
situation soon, they will wake up one day to realize they lost it all and being elite, they 
have the furthest to fall. 
China has an interesting pattern of power projection. It is ostensibly offering help 
to other countries and at the same time attacking them literally and figuratively. For 
instance, in early to mid-2021, while its vaccine diplomacy is going full strength in South 
America, it is feuding with its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea and 
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overwhelming them with “facts on the ground” because China can and the smaller, 
poorer neighbors cannot.226 All the while, China is dangling the carrot of economic and 
vaccine aid to these neighbors as long as they look the other way of the territorial 
encroachment. Furthermore, China has also recently been uncharacteristically loud about 
its near dominance, or at least its perceived near dominance, in the area of rare earths.227 
Indicating that perhaps export markets for rare earths may have difficulty receiving them 
if they push China too hard on matters such as Taiwan or the use of ethnic slave labor in 
Xinjiang Province.228 
These types of carrot and stick scenarios are a reminder that China knows it holds 
the power. This is how the CCP neo-imperialist methodology works by advancing a 
strategic agenda of obfuscation. If you are a small or intermediate country, you cannot 
just look at one issue at a time with China. You are forced to consider carefully your 
health, education, and economic infrastructure and decide if it is worth angering the 
source of much of your imports and economic aid. 
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By becoming the manufacturing and export hub of the world, China has laid the 
long-term plans of being able to destabilize all of its trading partners and make them 
think with every decision, “Is it worth angering China?”. Indeed, this psychology runs so 
deep that many skip the “Are we angering China” question altogether and jump straight 
to the conclusion that there is no possible way that their country’s manufacturing could 
compete with China so why even try.229 They cede both comparative and competitive 
economic advantages without even trying. 
The New Opium War 
  China has many legitimate grievances with the West. Probably the most 
understandable by all sides is the Opium Wars. The Chinese Qing Dynasty desired to 
stamp out the recreational use of opium that was being imported into China by the British 
and French in the mid-1800s. The colonial powers at the time did not agree with the Qing 
Dynasty’s desires and by force of arms compelled the Chinese to accept the India-
produced opium in decidedly lopsided battles. For such a proud people and culture, these 
losses were not easily forgiven or forgotten. Now the tables have turned and have given a 
small glimpse into China’s neo-imperial tendencies and what China as a world hegemon 
might look like. 
In the past decade, China has become the world leader in exporting ingredients for 
pharmaceutical use.230 Due to the massive amount of precursor materials and weak 
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regulations, China has also become the largest exporter of synthetic opioids, the most 
common of which is fentanyl, to the rest of the world.231 Chinese exporters provide the 
ingredients to distributors in North and South America which then pass them to gangs the 
complete the manufacturing process and smuggle the drug into America and Europe.232 
Furthermore, because of the difficulty in detecting the raw ingredients, they are often 
mailed directly into a country.233 
Nearly 30,000 Americans die each year from China-sourced illegal opioid use and 
this has become a major source of contention between the U.S. and China.234 President 
Xi, in 2017, supposedly agreed to crack down on illegal Chinese suppliers of opioids 
exactly how that will be done is unclear.235 Chinese anti-opioid laws since that time are 
often very specific, meaning new types of recipes are created quicker than laws are, thus 
allowing a large and glaring loophole for this market that not only is lucrative for the 
Chinese but also does real damage to the West. Analysts have repeatedly indicated that 
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the Chinese Government should close these loopholes by creating laws that are far more 
encompassing but Chinese regulators always find a reason not to do so.236 
One of the huge advantages China has over competing nations is that profits, both 
the monetary kinds and the power kind, often trump people and in China local economic 
growth often trumps everything else and local party corruption is well known and 
rampant.237 When deciding between the death of an anonymous American drug user and 
local economic growth, a local party official will probably not have a hard time deciding 
what to do with a producer. 
It cannot be said that the CCP is purposefully looking the other way or even 
encouraging the export of illegal drugs to the rest of the world for revenge, spite, or any 
other power-play reason. However, for a country that has a social credit system and 
boasts that it knows what everyone is doing at any given time,238 it makes one wonder 
why China cannot or is so slow in policing its pharmaceutical exports. In today’s world, 
China cannot force open trading markets or even dictate trading terms by force of arms, 
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but it can through economic foul play. In a China world order, it seems that China would 
choose to act like the imperialists of a bygone era. 
Could It Get Worse? 
Another preview of China-dominated norms is unfolding right now in the realm 
of vaccine diplomacy. Despite growing interest in the theory that COVID-19 began in a 
Chinese Government lab and was accidentally released through human error, the CCP 
spent nearly 6 weeks of the initial outbreak blaming and threatening others, hoarding 
medical supplies, and doing everything possible to make sure China came out ahead.239 
China’s Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine was one of the first developed in the world; 
however, the efficacy is amongst the lowest worldwide. But it has one advantage that 
many of the competitors do not - availability.240 Because of this, many developing 
countries have no choice but to seek out Sinovac as some percentage of efficacy is better 
than none. This is a huge win for China and deflects much of the COVID-19 blame. The 
Latin American Center at the Atlantic Council think tank published, “From a public 
relations standpoint, China has sought to shift the narrative from China being at the 
center of the COVID problem to China being at the center of the COVID solution.”241 
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The CCP has the power to decide which countries get the Sinovac and which do 
not. Therefore, it can be assumed that countries that sided with China or at least follow 
China’s lead will be the countries that receive the vaccine. In this, Brazil is an excellent 
case study. Brazil and China have had a complex history. China is a massive export 
market for Brazilian products like soybeans and the two countries seem content in the 
intergovernmental organization BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa).242 Yet, 
Brazil has been very hesitant to allow Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to 
operate and build telecommunications infrastructure in Brazil because of security 
concerns.243 Although Huawei is nominally a private company, the Chinese Government 
often makes government-level threats of sanctions and reciprocity if Huawei is not 
allowed to operate in a given country.244 Which is odd for a country that will not allow 
foreign telecommunications companies to operate within its borders. With massive 
amounts of COVID-19 cases occurring in Brazil, President Bolsonaro felt he did not have 
a choice but to bend to Chinese demands - if Brazil wanted Sinovac, Huawei access to 
the Brazilian market was the price. To move to the front of the Sinovac line, Brazilian 
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regulators allowed Huawei to enter a bid for a Brazilian 5G infrastructure project to be 
decided later in 2021.245 
But accepting Huawei was not the only term for getting the vaccine. President 
Bolsonaro seemingly also needed to walk back a statement critical of China that he had 
previously made, implicating China was using COVID-19 for its gain. President 
Bolsonaro stated, 
It is a new virus; nobody knows if it was born in a laboratory or by a human being 
that ate an inadequate animal. But it is there. The military knows what chemical, 
bacteriological and radiologic war is. Aren’t we facing a new war? Which country 
grew its GDP the most? I won’t tell you.246 
 
It would seem that he was referencing China. Evidentially, China thought so too. 
Shortly after President Bolsonaro made his comments, China restricted vaccines and 
vaccine ingredients to Brazil. When questioned about this, China’s Ambassador to Brazil 
revealed, “The Sinovac raw material is ready and available in refrigerated containers, just 
waiting for the authorization of the Chinese Government.”247 The only shortage of 
vaccines for the Brazilian people is an artificial one. The CCP was playing global power 
politics with vaccines and people’s lives. 
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As of this study, President Bolsonaro has not bowed to Chinese demands but Sao 
Paulo Provincial Governor Doria did. After meeting with Chinese officials and officially 
condemning President Bolsonaro’s remarks, Sao Paulo Province received a fresh supply 
of Sinovac.248  
However, Brazil is not the only developing country that is being pressured by the 
CCP. According to anonymous sources, “Latin American officials say China has pushed 
their countries to cut ties with Taiwan in return for badly needed COVID-19 vaccines.”249 
Very few countries have official ties with Taiwan and the number grows smaller every 
year due to PRC influence. For example, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Panama have all recently dropped their recognition of Taiwan because “China has 
invested in ports, roads, dams, and railways, often offering loans to Latin American 
governments, and made big purchases of minerals and agricultural commodities.”250 
Additionally, the Latin American countries that do still recognize Taiwan, Honduras, and 
Paraguay, reportedly have not been offered Sinovac although all their neighboring 
countries have.251 
Of course, the Sinovac and the power games being played by the CCP with it are 
just a small part of larger influence operations. Possibly the largest influence operation is 
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the global supply chain. If a single country holds the majority of the means of production, 
it could have a lot of influence. 
For years Western security and intelligence communities have been warning of 
the increasingly aggressive nature of Chinese actions in economics, business, and politics 
and that the West should not be ceding anything to China.252 However, monetary-interest 
voices were louder and have been shaping the debate. Possibly the strongest argument is 
that it is too late to change the economic status quo now, the boat should not be rocked, 
China must be engaged with for economic reasons. However, COVID-19 has opened the 
door to a crack for those that are not okay with appeasing China. Even strong China 
engagement advocates have been hedging their bets.253 Decision-makers are starting to 
understand that it may not be possible to make money off of China while relying on the 
U.S. and other Western states for world order. Indeed. they are coming to the realization 
that to do so they may end up with little money and little world order as Chinese 
intellectual property theft and unfair trade advantages strips them of their economic and 
technological control. The Chinese parasitic production model will eventually kill the 
host.254 
 
252 VOA, “US Intelligence Warns China, Russia Determined to Erode 
Washington’s Influence,” Voice of America, April 13, 2021, accessed June 13, 2021, 
https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-intelligence-warns-china-russia-determined-erode-
washingtons-influence 
253 Steven Erlanger, “Global Backlash Builds Against China Over Coronavirus,” 
New York Times, May 03, 2020, accessed June 12, 2021, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/03/world/europe/backlash-china-coronavirus.html 
254 Max Fisher, “Is the ‘China Model’ Failing?” The Atlantic, August 08, 2011, 




One example of a country that was fence-sitting and learned the hard way 
between the U.S. and China was France. In an attempt to hedge France’s defense sector’s 
bets, France willingly sold weapons to China. One French defense contractor stated that 
his country’s competitive advantage was that they were willing to work with anyone, 
unlike the United States.255 Unfortunately for the French, much of the equipment they 
sold to China has now been reverse engineered and exact duplicates recently appeared in 
Myanmar. This has caused the French company’s operations in Myanmar to cease and for 
the company to pull out altogether.256 They won the initial battle with quick money from 
China but lost the war due to their greed at the cost of their values. 
But the French are not alone. Factions in all countries are willing to do business 
with authoritarian regimes because of the money involved. One example is the Fang Fang 
group at California Polytechnical University, infiltrating student organizations and 
controlling political discourse, and distorting the conversation around sensitive PRC 
topics like Hong Kong. It was known that they were a group run by the Chinese 
government, it was no secret, but the lure of money was too strong.257 The CCP 
understands that it will be difficult for the world to rally against it if it can sow confusion 
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and dissension abroad. By keeping Americans arguing against each other or allies about 
what to do and how to do it, the CCP gains more time for itself. 
The CCP would love nothing more than to disrupt the social interaction between 
Western countries and developing countries as this would be the beginning of the end for 
cohesive Western norms.258 China sees developing countries as its core patrons259 and 
does not want any competition for them. One of China’s most effective ways of doing 
this is blaming the West for doing exactly what it is doing.260 Whether that be pushing 
false historical narratives, hyping an action as a threat that really is not a threat, or flat out 
lying.261  
Is It Working? 
The CCP will celebrate its 100-year-anniversary on 1 July 2021 with the theme, 
“Follow the Party Forever.”262 The difference between this and other CCP anniversaries 
is the blatant use of mixing the CCP with religious iconography and language. “In Party 
literature and state media, former revolutionary bases are labeled ‘holy sites,’ and the 
almost obligatory visits to such locations by the rank and file are meant to ‘baptize’ 
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members in the Communist faith.”263 One of the anniversary activities is an official 
poster series commemorating each year of the CCP. However, there is one year missing 
in the official press releases -1989. Perhaps the CCP believes that nothing of significance 
happened the year that the Tiananmen Square Massacre (a.k.a. Tiananmen Square 
protests and June Fourth Incident) occurred. Despite the CCP’s desire to bury the past, a 
former Chinese soldier on duty at Tiananmen Square recently noted that “China’s 
political education forces you to forget what happened in the past - forget the bad things 
that the Party did, and only remember the good things.”264 This type of whitewashing and 
censoring the past is not new inside of China and is quickly becoming the norm outside 
of China as well.265 
Some of the world appears to have woken to the growing strength of China and 
the CCP’s economic, political, and military agenda. Countries no longer are blind and 
deaf to “China’s illegal seizure and militarization of contested islands in the South China 
Sea; its rapid military build-up and modernization program” including bases outside of 
China’s historical sphere of influence; increasingly hostile and provocative acts and talk 
against Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang Province; economic colonization and debt-trap 
diplomacy of countries in South America, Africa, and South Asia via the Belt and Road 
Initiative; and, military incursions and actions in other countries’ borders.266 Although 
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many countries began to push back against Beijing pre-COVID-19, the pandemic has 
enhanced the spotlight on China, there is no homogeneous understanding of what to do 
about it.267 
Up until this time, China has had a relatively easy growth from a developing 
country to nascent world power. This was primarily due to the unorganized Western 
response to China’s growing power and monied interests. However, since revelations 
about the origin of COVID-19 and China’s neo-imperial expansion in all corners of the 
globe, country-specific internal divisions between engagement-favoring political and 
economic factions and defense and security factions seem to be shrinking.268 Beyond 
individual countries’ internal politics regarding China, there seems to be “a new round of 
international partnerships beyond China’s orbit. From economic alliances to” defense and 
security coalitions.269 
Shortly after assuming the U.S. presidency, President Biden held a virtual 
multilateral meeting with India, Japan, and Austria, known as the Quad. The Quad is 
nominally a quasi-official defense partnership aimed at countering China’s rise, although 
it also tackles other non- defense issues like climate change and vaccine diplomacy, non-
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many developing countries feel like China is their only option in non-defense matters. 
But nothing comes for free. Chinese aid now will have a cost later for these countries and 
these soft power advances are part of China’s comprehensive plans and power projection. 
Even when China is not using subterfuge to find a way to dominate, it struggles. It 
has recently entered into a series of trade agreements with Australia, Japan, and New 
Zealand that seem beneficial to all involved as long as all countries live up to their 
commitments.271 However, critics of these deals point out that these agreements can go 
wrong quickly and are terrible and that it was the Chinese side that insisted that the 
agreements be so watered-down and lacking rules for disputes resolution that they are 
meaningless.272 
More recently, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai had this to say about 
China after a meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Liu He, “If China cannot or will not 
adapt to international rules and norms, we must be bold and creative in taking steps to 
level the playing field and enhance our capabilities and partnerships.”273 Nevertheless, 
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Despite multiple setbacks. China has amazingly continued on a steady rise in the 
international sphere, becoming a power beyond East Asia. Even during a global 
pandemic, China has not let up on its goals and its methods of achieving them. The word 
“brilliance’ does not do justice to China’s rise. It has absorbed Hong Kong 30 years faster 
than expected, and supposedly legally allowed; openly began military movements 
intended to lay the groundwork for invading Taiwan; and, brazenly has militarily crossed 
internationally-recognized borders and seized territory and killed foreign troops274 with 
little to no pushback by the totality of the international community. China’s actions to 
grow its power fall within the definition of neo-imperialism or “...territorial acquisitions... 
building their empires with new technological advances and developments, expanding 
their territory through conquest, and exploiting the resources of the subjugated 
countries.”275 Nevertheless, China’s dominance in supply chains and economic 
considerations are the largest hindrances in stopping the rest of the world from trying to 
curb this behavior.276 
“It seems less of an issue to rock the economic boat if that boat is already 
sinking.”277 China’s actions, culminating with COVID-19, may have been a breaking 
point for many countries, to the point where economic “decoupling from China can 
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appear relatively minor in comparison.”278 Examples of the first signs of this from the 
U.S. are the use of the Defense Production Act to kickstart portions of the supply chain 
for critical items that were once ceded to China, the reversal of Hong Kong’s special 
economic status, and the change in financial regulations specifically to target Chinese 
businesses listed on U.S. stock markets. Previous to the pandemic, it was difficult to 
challenge China over both its ambitions and the methods to reach those ends as China 
had built itself a cadre of client states that would protect China.279  
Much like the Cold War world, it feels like countries will need to choose between 
the U.S. or China, that the days of playing one against the other but maintain robust 
relations with both may be coming to an end. However, more study and more quantitative 
data are needed to fully understand China’s ambitions. Because the internal machinations 
of China are so difficult to detect, understand, and research from a Western perspective, it 
is problematic to properly forecast Chinese intentions without a fair amount of cognitive 
bias and heuristics. What is clear though is the world can expect more economic and 
military expansion and whitewash from China, both its history and that of other 
countries, as China continues its neo-imperial actions as it tries to change global norms 
and values.  
Global attention has shifted from the West to China. China’s next moves will 
determine whether it ascends to power status or whether its reach exceeds its grasp 
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causing a backlash from its seemingly neo-imperialist actions that hope to breakdown the 




















Conclusion: “Be extremely subtle even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely 
mysterious even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of 
the opponent’s fate.”280 
Where are We Now? 
This paper has put forward many arguments around the true nature of the CCP, its 
propaganda campaigns, and its threat to not just the West but the entire world. The CCP 
is a neo-fascist and neo-imperialist regime with dreams of global hegemony. To achieve 
its desire of becoming the world’s hegemon and replacing current global norms with that 
of its own, it has interfered in the domestic politics of other countries, created vassal 
states and neo-feudal systems, and has attempted to influence local, state, and federal 
elections in the United States. The case studies, anecdotes, and circumstantial evidence 
are clear in those regards. However, what is still needed is quantitative evidence, 
objective measurements that are not subject to bias, and non-cognitive manipulation. 
There is room for more research and study and the timeframe requirement is now before 
the West sacrifices its values for promises of economic growth that are bound to the 
whims of the CCP. 
The West still holds out hope for China. That with a little more patience, a little 
more accommodation, the CCP will understand that its ideology has been a dead man 
walking for the past 100 years. China views the West as its adversary for its Century of 
Humiliation and its denying the CCP of what it believes is its rightful place at the head of 
 




all nations. China seeks to stamp out and destroy the current systems. While the West, on 
the other hand, sees China as a competitor,281 a strategic foe to go back and forth with.  
The United States, specifically, has done everything it can to normalize relations 
with China, pushing for WTO and Most Favored Nation trade status. China has 
welcomed this and used it to its advantage. Despite constant strategic threats, implied and 
actual, by the CCP, even President Biden has given China one pass after another.282 
Indeed, the political and economic elite in America has done more than just give China a 
pass, they actively attacked anyone that speaks differently. President Trump was derided 
for his actions against China, not on policy differences but that China could be a problem 
at all.283 The same is true for previous academics who dared raise their voices in counter 
to Chinese actions in their schools and the media. Furthermore, whenever China broke 
international promises or violated global norms, instead of standing up for Western 
values, politicians dithered and let themselves be cowed by Chinese threats. These elites 
did these things despite China rejecting Western engagement and the global norms that 
allowed it to advance so quickly.  
A Hybrid Model 
The PRC has taken the most effective parts of various authoritarian political 
models and mixed them with the most effective parts of economic capitalism to create a 
 
281 Adam Edelman, “Biden's Comments Downplaying China Threat to U.S. Fire 








system that will not go away soon or easily. When China first rolled out its “one country, 
two systems” policy in the late 1990s it was immediately lauded as a victory for the 
West. China, it seemed, was well on its way to eschewing communism for the benefits of 
Western capitalism and liberal democracy. Certainly, once the Chinese populace got a 
taste of the West, the CCP would fall. Yet, the China Model has been impervious to 
democratic gains and has possibly fallen further away on the right-left spectrum of 
political theory. 
The first signs of China’s newfound status can be traced to the 2009 World 
Economic Forum in Davos. Here, shortly after the Financial Crisis, the world’s elite 
politicians and economic minds were blasted by first-time attendee Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao. Wen concluded that if the world was to avoid a financial disaster like 2008 again, 
it needed to embrace the Chinese political-economic model.284 In 2012, China showed the 
world what it could do and what it was willing to do by physically expanding into the 
South China Sea by claiming and militarizing islands in other countries’ exclusive 
economic zones and publicly rolling out the BRI a year later in 2013. The world was on 
notice, you are either with China or against them. 
Elites quickly joined. Esteemed New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman 
called the CCP an “enlightened group of people” whose use of authoritarianism was a 
“great advantage” over the slow plodding of democracy.285  Economists of note opined 
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that perhaps the economic model of the Washington Consensus had run its course and 
should be replaced by the Beijing Consensus.286 The Chinese seized upon this Western 
vacillation to forcefully push their agenda via the West’s media. Of course, the cost in 
terms of values and freedoms was never discussed or considered. If the CCP was publicly 
considered a fascist party, support for anything related would fall quickly. 
From the of end of World War II until the 2008 Financial Crisis, liberal 
democracy and capitalism were the order of the day. Even when capitalism failed to 
achieve optimal results, most countries did not consider the U.S.S.R.’s alternative 
economic plan as a valid choice, certainly not countries in the heart of the West. The 
rallying cry of the West was “freedom” and “democracy.” It appears now for many elites, 
that those have a price. 
Unlike the U.S.S.R., China has shown that its system works as a valid economic 
system for rapid modernization, growth, and a way to lift millions out of poverty. Or at 
least it works if the rest of the world plays along with China’s rules, harkening back to 
traditional tribute models. It is unclear how long China could achieve its impressive 
economic growth numbers if IP theft and technology transfer were not happening or if 
China ceased to have primacy in manufacturing. Nevertheless, the CCP has proven its 
model is successful though it probably has more to do with its unique circumstances 
including’ geography, demographics and population, and politics. 
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However, unlike capitalism and the theories of competitive and comparative 
advantages that teach that economics is a non-zero-sum game, for the China Model, there 
can be only one winner. The Chinese model would not work if every country tried to be 
like China. The Chinese historical tribute model only works if it is the only country 
receiving tribute. Nevertheless, the thought of economic growth with Chinese money 
blinds many countries, including Western, to the true cost of such get-rich-quick 
schemes. 
Every move the CCP makes is an attempt to strengthen itself. As noted earlier, Xi 
told the military to support the Party, not the country, not the people, not China’s 
constitution, but the Party. If every domestic move the CCP makes is to strengthen its 
power, it follows that every international relationship is for the benefit of the Party. The 
China Model does not operate on a fair and open basis, it would not work if it did and it 
would not work if every country did it. 
The China Model is nothing more than using the West's own values, institutions, 
and economic interests against itself. China complains broadly when it feels other 
countries are interfering in its domestic affairs but does not hesitate to interfere in other 
countries’ internal affairs. Likewise, China is quick to run to intergovernmental 
organizations when it believes it is aggrieved but discounts the authority of those same 
bodies when China is the defendant. Furthermore, in the business realm, China insists on 
advantages for Chinese firms and businesses both at home and abroad. Whether that be in 
the form of Party members having seats on company boards, technology transfer, IP 
sharing, or forcing Chinese businesses upon another country. All these things are to 
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strengthen the CCP, not to advance human rights or lift people out of poverty. If those 
things do occur, it is strictly a byproduct. 
However, as this paper makes clear, the China Model, which is now a synonym 
for fascism and neo-imperialism, is a means to the end of CCP dominance, and 
democratic countries are aiding China’s rise at all costs methods. There is hardly a 
Western country that China is not currently censuring or threatening for some reason, 
usually coming down to giving China an advantage in some area. Beyond the current 
examples in Chapter 3, Australia has found that China is committing genocide against 
Uighur Muslims and meddled in Australia’s democratic process. But before Australia 
could enact counter-policies, China had already labeled Australia as a whole as racist, 
Sino-phobic, and interfering in Chinese domestic affairs, as well as generating economic 
sanctions against Australia.287 
Time is on China’s Side 
Some countries and elites are starting to believe, whether that be through coercion 
or not, in China. And the longer this goes on, the easier it will be for Chinese norms to 
become the norm. This soft-power projection and slowly but surely norm changing is 
highlighted by the use of foreign elites, institutions, and media to spread positive 
messages about China. The flagship of China’s foreign influence and propaganda 
methods is the CCP controlled and funded Confucius Institutes that have taken root in 
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nearly every major American and Western university. Year over year since 2009, China 
has given more in foreign aid, which the CI program falls under than the World Bank. 
This investment is starting to show dividends for China. One real-world example 
is Venezuela. Every time it seems the ruling regime has tipped too far and will fall; 
Chinese loans and aid have kept the regime in power.288 This model is repeated 
throughout the world. Struggling regimes receive an economic lifeline in the short-term 
often at long-term rates that are unsustainable and China reaps the rewards. As one 
Indonesian politician explained, “There are, of course, no official statements from 
Southeast Asian countries about their decisions to follow the Beijing Consensus or not. 
The attraction to the Chinese Model is unconscious.”289 The attraction is automatic. The 
terms at the beginning are too good to even think about the future. 
Wibowo worried that many countries, envying China’s economic growth, “have 
shifted their development strategy from one based on free markets and democracy to one 
based on semi-free markets and illiberal political systems. Most Southeast Asian 
countries have moved in the direction of China and away from liberal democracy over the 
past decade.”290 China is winning the influence war and concerningly, Wibowo found 
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that two of the most changed portions of political control were moving from a system of 
multi-parties to one-party dominance and politicizing the judiciary.291 
The China Model of trying to return to the Middle Kingdom via tributes, neo-
imperialism, and fascist nationalist traits has many flaws, including allowing and in some 
cases promoting official corruption, the lack of checks-and-balances which moderates 
parties, and a belief that ideology is more important than anything else. These are the 
downfalls of many autocratic regimes but despite these problems, China has seen 
tremendous growth in money and power on the world stage. 
The West should take some, if not most, of the blame for allowing China to 
succeed economically while not changing politically. China is just using the same tactics 
the previous imperialists have used against it but using the economy rather than force of 
arms. Every time the West allows China to steal IP, censor itself in fear of angering 
China in the realm of human rights or kowtow to Chinese non-reciprocal demands it 
strengthens China’s will, influence, and power to set new global norms or at the very 
least ignore the present norms. 
The Great Awakening?  
China’s increasingly aggressive foreign relations have caused some push back and 
countries are starting to realize the true cost of China’s largesse. It is possible that 
Chinese norms and models will not overtake those of global and Western norms in the 
next decade. The world is too diverse and the challenges are too extreme for one system 
to take total control. If this were not true, Western values would have a monopoly and 





Modern Chinese political ideology and actions can no longer be ignored in 
today’s world. Its desire to control every facet of Chinese life and increase the lives of 
non-Chinese, government-sponsored racism and ethnic superiority and intense 
nationalism mixed with a one-party rule are stark reminders of fascist and imperial 
regimes of the past. These similarities need to be studied more by researchers and 
academics that have guarantees against Chinese retribution and censorship. 
Chinese censorship has reached America and even its rural communities. China 
continues to use the American media against itself in an attempt to influence federal-level 
policies by planting stories, censoring content, and financially supporting American 
media and educational institutions. However, it is difficult to precisely determine what 
effects, if any, Chinese propaganda efforts in the U.S. have had on elections and policies. 
More studies and larger studies with quantitative analysis are needed. 
Many Westerners do not want the open-ended and one-sided appeasement of 
China to end. This makes sense as they are the ones making money from the current 
arrangement. However, it must be done. The engagement policies set forth by the Nixon 
arrival in Beijing were built on a foundation of half-truths and false promises that China 
would join the world order and its norms, not seek to overthrow it and create its own. 
With China’s belief in its divine mandate zero-sum game, that it was and is destined to 
once again become the center of the world, the West must either abandon its values and 
norms or abandon China until it changes itself. China has long held that it is at war with 
the United States, eventually, the U.S. and the West will either understand and fight or 
submit. If China does not change its zero-sum mentality the world order system and the 
global norms built around human rights are at stake.  
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There is a myriad of policy prescriptions that individual governments could take 
in addressing Chinese behavior but the first step is to publicly label China’s actions for 
what they are at a global level: manipulative, deceitful, harmful, and imperialist. If China 
is acting in a fascist manner, it should be noted. If China is acting illegally, it should be 
brought before a court. Public opinion is the best regulator of a regime that is desperately 
attempting to keep the Mandate of Heaven. 
Once China is judged and publicly shamed by the international community by its 
actions, not just its words, China will need to confront its actions which will be to the 
benefit of the global community and established norms and values. By ignoring these, 
China will be emboldened and will speed up its efforts to overthrow current systems. The 
West’s model might not produce the economic gains of China but the externality values 
and freedoms are worth the cost. “Where there is [freedom], the governors must live in 
constant awe of the opinions of the governed.”292 
In his seminal piece regarding the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism 
over fascism and communism, The End of History, Francis Fukuyama wrote, “It matters 
very little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso for we are 
interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological heritage of 
mankind.”293 Unfortunately for Fukuyama, China is not Albania or Burkina Faso and any 
“strange thoughts” that China has do matter. “Strange thoughts” like China could merge 
capitalism into its political system rather than succumbing to liberal democracy. This 
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“strange thought” is only strange because Fukuyama seems guilty of the cognitive bias of 
mirror imaging, expecting China to act as America would act and how much of the world 
was acting to the shock of a suddenly unipolar world. It is “strange” to Western thinkers 
but not to Chinese thinkers whose very lives depended on thinking outside the Western 
way of thinking or they would meet the same fate as Soviet Communist members.  
Perhaps Westerners should have “strange thoughts” before it is too late. Here is 
one example: China, under the CCP, will not become more politically liberal. On the 
contrary, with increasing political partisanship and ethnic and national tribal and clannish 
culture, the U.S. may become more like China. 
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